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This thesis Is an analysis determined by the investigative
proposition, what is a magic realist speech act? Of the schools of
thought available to any philosophical undertaking in literature, this
thesis makes particular use of the principles of speech act theol}',
genre theol}', and poststructurallsm. With genre theol}', the emphasis
is on the subgeneric construction of the narrative structure, and this
thesis will incorporate three short stories from Peter Carey's The Fat
Man in HlstonJ as the most overt eVIdence for what the thesis Is
proposing to analyse and lllumlnate. But on the whole, readers will
understand that, while the short stories analysed contribute to the
specific concepts and notions of the thesis, the thesis itself is written
with the purpose of being able to determine some of the conditions
and indicators that make up the larger structure of subgenerlc magic
realism in narratives other than Carey's.
With speech act theol}' and poststructurallsm, the thesis will
focus essentially on the dialogue between John. R. Searle (1979) and
Jacques Derrlda (1979) on the work of the founder of speech act
theol}', John. L. Austin (1962). The impetus of that dialogue Is the
distinction made, by Austin and Searle, between serious discourse, or
ordinary language, and non~serious discourse, or fictional discourse.
This distinction is argued to be. by speech act philosophers, a
necessal}' condition of being able to establish a general theolY of
speech acts, or felicitous performances, that can be classified
according to their illocutionary forces in ordinary circumstances.
Derrida, however, proposes that such felicitous performances, in any
circumstance, can be established if, and only if, one considers their
infelicitous, or parastic, counterpart In fictional dlscurslvily as an
object of analysis to speech act theol}' rather than an object of
exclusion. In what may generally be considered a Derrldean approach,
this thesis will place such an exclusive binal}' opposition 'under
erasure' to show that the principles of speech act theol}' are wholly
applicable to non-serious discourse and su bgenerlc narrative
structures, which In our case Is magic realism. Indeed, this thesis will
take, as Its point of departure. the notion that the erasure between
serious and nop.-sertous discourse Is already In place, thereby allowing
the argument to concentrate on the principles of speech act theol}' in
i

t1ctional discourse as well as Its wider applicability to the
construction of any su bgenerlc act In genre theory.
Finally, a considerable focus Is given to \he notion of closure In
fictional discourse between Author Function and Reader Function.
Using Carey as an example, the thesis will look at how subgenerlc
magic realism foregrounds both poststructural play and narrative
closure, entertaining the possibility of the two, according to the
respective contexts of each condition on the quantum level and larger
structure of a narrative's performance. Furthermore, this possible
duality of language, this aporia, Is, In this thesis, held to he common
to all subgenres, known and unknown to genre theory, as well as to
the performances of language In both the literary and extra-literary
realities.
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l11itroduction: "Positions".

Because our position, In this thesis, engages In an analysts
which consists of the principles of speech act theory and genre theory,
It will be beneficial for readers to bear In mind the familiar model of
the Functions of Language tbeortsed by Roman Jakobson (1960). This
model, and Its six basic functions, Is schematically reproduced as
follows;
con..ext

(Jal<otmn, 1960:353).

Jakobson offered this model of linguistic functions, at a
conference on style ln language, within the context of establishing the
poetic function as a viable extensJon of the J.ingutstic enterprise.
Poetics, for Jakobson, 'deals primarily with the question, What makes
a verbal message a work of art?' (I 960:350), and It Is this principle
that he sought to Illuminate and apply to linguistic evaluations of
artfulness. Because literary studies and linguistic studies focus on the
nature of the vet bal message In Its relevant contexts, the poetics that
Is the 'focal portion' (1960:352) of l!tcrary studies, In analysing the
verbal message, Is wholly applicable to the linguistic enterprise as a
function, just like the other functions In the above schema.
However, Jakobson states that, '(b]efore discussing the poetic
function we must define its place among the other functions of
language· (1960:353). The model of the six basic functions, therefore,
Is no different from the popular ordinary language approach,
undertaken by many philosophers, In their attempt to draw
distinctions between communication In ordinary circumstances and
'literary' circumstances. For Jakobson, Its purpose Is to set up a
dividing llne between the ordinary message and the literary message,
so that the poetic function Is shown to be responsible for the crossing
of that communicative line when poetics Is applied to linguiStics as It
IE used In literary studies. Thus Jakobsen's schema Is designed to
explain the functions of language In ordinary circumstances. before he
can explain the operative nature of the poetic function amongst these
1

ordlnacy language functions.
The moves that follow, In Jakobson's argument, are destgned to
produce a further schema, s!mllarly based on the six basic functions
of ordlnacy language In communication, that illuminate the poetic
function's operative nature not only in an appropriate sense to Ute.ary
studies, but also as a methodology wholly applicable to the analysis of
poetic communication In linguistic studies. The conclusion Is that the
poetic function In the literacy model Is equivalent to the message
function In the ordlnacy model.
Jakobson argues that '[p]oetic function Is not the sole function
of verbal art but only Its dominant, determining function, w:1ereas In
all other verbal activities It acts as a subsldlacy, accessocy
constituent' (1960:356). And because the poetic function Is dominant,
verbal arl, as object of analysis In literacy and linguistic studies, has
Its message wholly determined by the hegemony of tl1e poetic function
over the other functions. Jakobson states that '[ t]he set... toward the
MESSAGE as such, focus on the message for Its own sake, Is the
POETIC function of language' (1960:356). Jakobson's second schema
(1960:357) tries to show this relationship by structuring a model that
does not implicate the same, ordinary, functions, where the function
of the message Is equal to the other functions, but special literacy
derivatives of those functions, centred on the importance of the
message, even though they are grounded In a model designed to
explain ordinary circumstances. Jakobsen's second schema is, in part,
the structuralist answer to the problem of distinguishing ordlnacy
language use and poetic language use by the Implied difference In the
way messages are constructed.
Whlle I do not disagree with Jakobson's first schema, as
reproduced In this Introduction, I find the notion of his second
schema of poetic language rather problematic to literacy studies and
Itngutst!c studies. Indeed, this Implied difference Is one that creeps up
In speech act theocy when Austin ( 1962) and Searle (1970) are both
adamant that ordlnacy language, as the object of analysing
performatives and their lllocut!ons, must be .considered first and
foremost over their fictional derivatives, or non-serious
representations. We will have recourse to this difference later in the
Introduction, and the thesis In general. But, for the moment, we can
state that the notion of a poetic language has been proven to be a
fallacy due to the poststructural strategy towards language, and the
2

postmodern condition of pastiche In the extra-literary reality.
Jakobsen's second schema, therefore, cannot but collapse Its Implied
difference Into the ordinary language model on which It Is based, and
from which It trtes to escape.
The notion of trylug to determine the artfulness of a verbal
message, as different from an ordinary message, cannot be removed
from the other basic functions of the frrst schema, and cannot be
removed.from the ordinary circumstances of language, from the langue
and parole, In which literary discourse Is lntrtnslcally grounded and of
which 1t ls a part. Furthennore, to argue that verbal art produces
messages for its own sake, without any recourse to the conditions
that m<.ike up the message, Is to say that verbal a.t exists In a
communicative vacuum of its own making, 8':-J.ci cannot be analysed
beyond such an isolated existence. This has, cf course, been proven to
be a fallacy by such schools of thought as marxism, feminism, and
postcolontallsm. The literary message and the ordinary message, like
the ficllonal speech act and the ordinary speech act, are Inextricable
from each other because of their Interdependency on the dialogic
nature of speakers who use them.
Let us, then, bear in mind Jakobsen's first schema as we
Investigate textual utte•·ances by speech act principles and genre
theory throughout this thesis. But first we must rewrite the schema
somewhat In order to show the appllcablity of one model to both the
literary and extra-literary performances of speech acts. Indeed, the
changes that follow are minor, gtven the argument of this thesis and
the nature of thought in current philosophical S~:'!hools on literature
and language. Consider the following as a comparison between our
schema and J:akobson's schema:

-

Author Function

-

-

context
production/lranslixenoe of Irffil1lng

g=e/su~

Reader Function

-

axle

At first glance, our schema may be considered as just another
derivative of an ordinary language model In a literary circumstance.
This, I will a<gue, Is misconceived. Both Author Function and Reader
Function are Interchangeable w_tth addresser and addressee, but serve ,'
to Illuminate the functions to which both the addresser and the
3

addressee are committed In the production and transference of
meaning. Indeed, the notion of Author Function Is based on
Foucault's (1986: I 19) proposition that the authnr ls a constraining
figure through which the potential of fictional dlscurslvliles pass and
are organised according to the copyright of the proper name, the
styllstics associated with that proper name, and the body of work that
constitutes the proper name as an existence separate from the actual
person. In this sense, Reader Function ls Its complementary literary
position ln determining those processes that sanctify the name and
the body of work, as well as belng a position committed to producing
and transferring a message that Is considered to have a meaning
relevant to the text ln question, or work ln general. As Iser (1989:78)
has stated, the reader climbs aboard the text and ln doing so, accepts
certain given perspectives which interact with themselves and with
him or herself.
This acceptance, or commitment, ls further based on the
Bakhtinian concept of dlalogtsm (1981) so that the message ls both
tbe product of the other functions as well as the ongotng commitment
of the speakers to each other ln the dynanucs of a public dialogue. As
we can see ln our schema by the representative arrows, the message is
not unidirectional. as ln Jakobson's schema, but dialogic and
Interdependent on all the functions of the model. This amendment.
whlle betng based on the p:,nosophy of M. M. Bakhtln, further
benefits from its ablllty to Incorporate both poststructuralism and the
Saussurean model of language, or langue.
Genre and subgenre are also Important to both the llterary and
the extra-llterary reallties because they help to generate and maintain
a level of contact that ls appropriate to a particular performatlve
Interchange, or, once again, a dialogue. In the llterary reallty, this ls
quite common and generally accepted, even lf lt ls challenged from
tlme to tlme, but ln the extra-llterary reallty, the genre and subgenre
play a particular role ln the underdeveloped theory of speech genres.
Furthermore, the notion of genre and subgenre as the contactjunctlon
compiles with the requirements of genre theory, where genre lmpl!es
the medium, In our case the short story, and subgenre Implies Its
propositional content, which ln our case ls magic realism. Depending
on the genre and subgenre being used, this process is equally
applicable to the notion of contact ln the extra-literary reality. For
us, however, it ls Important in the sense that uur future discussion on
4

appropriateness conditions nnd subgenerlc indicators Is based on the
notion that such conditions and indicators function to maintain a
contact between the Author Function and the Reader Function In
order to communicate the felicities and Infelicities of an lllocutlon In
a specific narrative performance.
While the code and context do r,ot, lr! '!eneral, alter their
conceptual functions from Jakobsen's schema to our schema, we
must Include the postructural strategy towards language to which
Jakobson had not been exposed at the time of theorising his
structural model. With regard to the rode, the ability for the Author
Function and the Reader Function to check up on the signifying
nature of the language used can amount to closure If. and only If. as
Bakhtln would argue (1981), the potential of the word Is realised In
the context of another speaker, namely either the Author Function or
the Reader Function. Thus the possibility for closure In a speech act,
In both the literary and extra-literary realities, will depend on the
awareness of the dialogue that Will follow. Even though there Is a gap
in the production and transference of meaning of a literary context,
one cannot conclude from the existence of this gap that closure
cannot be obtained In the face of play. There Is a variety of methods In
which a Reader Function can check up on the possible messages of
the Author Function in order that he or she may complement the
strongest closure of those messages In a dialogic state of Authority.
This will be discussed In chapter three of the thesis.
With respect to the context. the change that occurs to the
schema Is also poststructurai. As we have already discussed regarding
the code, and as Jacques Derrlda I 1979) had originally pointed out in
terms of speech act theory, an Indeterminate amount of play occurs by
the ever-shifting grapheme from context to context prior to Its being
classified as a signature, or mark, In the locution. This Is particularly
useful when examining the subgenre of magic realism, as we shall do
In this thesis, but It does not Imply that a multiplicity of contexts has
the predominant Influence over the Inability to obtain closure In a
larger structure. or the plethora of acts In a subgenerlc narrative.
Indeed. In the extra-l!terary speech act. a multiplicity of contexts
shifts through the dialogue of two speakers but these contexts do not
necessarily Imply that closure Is an Impossibility. We may argue that
closure Is tentative between two speakers at any given time, but this
still does not sacrifice closure to the plurality of contexts In

-
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graphematlc play. Once again, the notion of code can help to close off
such play, even when a closure contains, as it does in magic realism,
the appropriateness conditions of multiple contexts extracted from the
ever shifting grapheme. This combination of code and context forms
much of the assumptions and arguments Oil closure and play
throughout this thesis when we examine both the quantum level and
the larger structure in three of Carey's short stories.
All in all, our schematic model, based on Jakobson's Functions
q{Language, is useful to readers of this thesis as a point of departure
for the argu1nents that are yet to come. I will have only minor recourse
to the model because of word economy, so readers are here made
aware that, while it is more or less absent in a lexical sense, its
conceptual presence should always be noted.
I have already mentioned the poetic language distinction made
by Austin. For Austin (1962), the distinction specitlcally takes the
form of non-serious dtscou,-se, S!lch as fiction, poetry or theatre, as
opposed to serious discourse, or ordinary language. The obJect of
analysis for speech act theory is. according to Austin, the
illocutionary force of ordinary language because its semantic
performance is determined by the sor.::ial conventions that classify it as
a certain performative type. Austin states (1962:22) that non-serious
discourse falls under the classification of the eUolattons of language,
and, therefore, illocutionary force cannot apply to the parasite of an
ordinary performance because, under those circumstances, we do not
hold the speaker responsible to the speech act he or she had just
uttered.
However, a few pages later, when Austin (1962:27) discusses the
notion of a performative misfire, he refers hts readers to Don Quixote
as an example of how and why a misfire may occur within the context
of the code of honour and challenges laid in duelling. If non-serious
discourse, or fictional discourse is an etiolation, then why invoke a
parasitic example to explain the performatlve misfire in an ordinary
circumstance? It is my contention that a parasitic discourse, such as
prose narrative, poetry or theatre, is just as capable of issuing an
lllocutlon in both the literary and extra-literary realities as Is the
ordinary, or serious discourse of speech act theory. But let us
continue with this problem.
Searle ( 1979:68) argues for much the same end as Austin when
tt comes to the distinction between serious and non~sertous
6

discourses, but he is generous enough to give the non-serious, or the
parasite, the lllocutlonary force and act of pretending as long as It Is
grounded within the intentionality of the author's written utterance.
Thus a difference between Austin and Searlte, on the notion of an
lllocutlon, Is foregrounded by the fact that Austlnlan lllocutlon ts
determined by the social conventions of public speakers, whereas
Searlean lllocuUon Is determined by the Intentions of the individual
speaker to the codes and conventions oflanguage use.
We will return to this problematic difference In chapter three,
but for now It will suffice for readers to understand that, within the
context of Searlean lllocutlon and fictional dlscursMty, the most an
author can do Is pretend rather than promise, or pretend rather than
command, or pretend rather than any of the other lllocutlons that
apply to serious 'Jiscourse. As Searle argues, 'the author of a work of
fiction pretends-, to perform a series of illocutionacy acts, normally of
the assertive type' (1979:65). Aild '[w}hat makes It a work of fiction Is,
so to speak, the lil<>C:.!Iion:>.:y stance that the author takes tcNard It,
and that stance Is a matter of complex lllocutlonary Intentions that
the author has when he writes or otherwise composes it' (1979:65-66).
Searlean lllocutton in fictional discourse is the act of
pretending, first, last, and always. This Is what Searle (1979) tenned
as the logical status of fictional discourse In the essay of the same
title. Thus the hidden assumption being made by such a conclusion Is
that speech act theory can only speak of the Ulocutlonary force and
act of pretending when It comes to Its analytical application Ia nonserious discourse. Even when Searle (1979:73-74). clUng the opening
utterance of AnnaKarentna as an example. admits that an author can
inject serious utterances into a novel, he concludes that while the
opening sentence is a genuine assertion and not a fictional pretence,
under such circumstances, tt serves as a part of the novel but is not a
part of the fictional story.
1 find Searle's conclusions, regarding Anna Karenlna and
fictional discourse In general, an attenuation of the scope of the
theory within the total use of language between the llterary and extraliterary realities. It may be right to argue that speech act theory has
Its llmltatlons, but I do not think that the non-serious, the parasite,
or flctlonal discourse, Is one of them, becauae Its lllocuttonary status
In the extra-llterary reality can often exceed that of mere pretence. The
problem Is, of course, a classic dilemma In the history of both western
7

philosophy and l!terary theory. Searle foregrounds this problem quite
neatly with hls desire to build up knowledge of the lllocutlon on the
underlying force of Platonism, or the western appropriation and
Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms by Its grandeur as a system
made up of pure things and their variants. Thus, from the outset of
establishing a body of knowledge called speech act theory, Searle
states that while 'concepts In ordinary language lack absolutely strict
rules', he will direct hls analysis 'at the center of the concept of a
performance and wlll tgnore 'marginal. fringe, and partially defective'
variants of the performatlve In question (1970:55). This Is, of course,
an open Invitation for a rigidly playful attack on Searle through the
poststructural strategy towards language, anct brtngs us to the further
problem of the binary opposition In systems of knowledge and
processes of thought.
Both Searle and Austin allow for the felicitous performance of
an act within the strictly hard and fast structure of a binary
opposition. Searle argues that 'the pretended lllocutions which
constitute a work of fiction are made possible by the existence of a set
of conventions which suspend the normal operation of the rules
relating lilocutionary acts and the world' (1979:67). And Austin, as we
have already stated, argues that '(!language In such circumstances Is
In special ways -Intelligibly- used not seriously, but In ways parasitic
upon its normal use -ways which fall under the doctrine of the
eUolatlons oflanguage· (1962:22). For Austin and Searle. what is at the
left of the binary opposition has a relevant, platonic purity, of which
the right side cannot but be Its parasitic variant that wlll corrupt the
body of knowledge they are trying to establish. Thus serious/ nonserious dlscurslvlty Is akin to the ordinary I parasite distinction that
marks the need for purity and rtgour on the left, and marginal
exclusions, or etiolated corruptions on the right. Their distinction of
serious/ non-serious dtscurstvtty is no different frmn the structuralist
desire, which we discussed concerning Roman Jakobsen, for a poetic
language system that has distinctions from the langue of everyday use,
or ordinary speech.
Since, however, both fictional discourse and ordinary discourse
share the common denominators of rules In the expressing and
understanding of messages, we must consider how great the difference
actually Is between serious and non-serious dlvlslons. Thus one of the
underlying forces that directs this thesis Is based on the notion that
8

when Searle and Austin exclude the non-serious for fear of corrupting
the serious. they wlll find their thought marked by the stain of the
parasite, and they will find their theories continually slipping Into the
corruption from which they think they have escaped. To speak magic
realist Is to speak by the rules, rtgour. and illocutions of the nonserious, and to be able speak in those non-serious illocutlons reflects
our ability to speak tn the ordinary speech that exists tn the totalizing
forces of language. There may be a marked difference tn the way we
apprehend and understand the literary and the extra-literary reality,
but that difference Is only minor when It comes to the illocutions that
constitute It In a linguistic sense.
Furthermore, we must ask to what degree both Austin and
Searle participate In the poetic language fallacy that plagued
structuralism In Its desire for an holistically separate system of
poetics, or fictionally orchestrated language. As Pratt states, '[tJhe fact
that...there Is a real langue shared by literary and non-literary
utterances alike Is quite overlooked and seems almost Irrelevant to the
line of argument these quotations indicate' ( 1977: 10). Equally, she
argues that '[a[ll utterances take place against the background of a
whole range of contemporary norms governing what styles, what
subject matter, what degrees of formality, politeness, and so on are
appropriate tn differe>'t contexts' (1977: 10). While this problem of the
poetic language fallacy Is wdl-known to literary theory when It comes
to discourse and crittctsm, it seems to have gone unnoticed in speech
act theory, and gone unnoticed In the philosophy of language In which
Austin and Searle were writing. I will not elaborate on the problem
any further because, In Its current simplicity, the notion of a poetic
language fallacy allows readers of this thesis to understand Its
implications to speech act theory In much the same way as It plagued
structuralism and its predecessor, Russian Formalism.

Derrlda (Limited Inc, abc., or Lim. 1979:240) argues that, while
Austin and Searle both recognise that the parasite Is part of ordinary
language, It did not stop them from excluding It In their analysis of
serious discourse. Thus for Derrlda, Austin's concept of ordinary
language, as It Is formed In the context of speech act theory, 'Is clearly
marked by this exclusion' (Lim. 1979:241), even though the object of
exluslon, the parasite, Is clearly a part of the concept of the ordinary
from the outset. In both 'Signature, Event, Context' and 'Limited Inc.,
abc .. .', Derrlda Is adamant that such an exclusion of the parasite Is
9

liable to put the question of fellcltles and lnfellclties, appllcable to
lllocutionary acts and the purity of performatives, under corruption
when classifying serious types of dlscurslvlty, since the parasite can
and wlll always return to corrupt the health and happiness of the
performance and the theory.
In his answer to Searle's notion of a logical status for fictional
dlscurslvlty, Derrtda (Lim. 1979:239) points to Searle's own admission
that the SLarlean theory of speech acts Is but a part of an overall
theory that does not yet exist and, for Denida, this Is evidence enough
that Searle's treatise on parasitism and its logical status of
lllocutionary pretending Is but a parasite Itself of the whole theory of
speech acts. The problem for Searle, as seen by Derrlda, Is that the
parasite cannot be excluded from speech act theory, and cannot be
excluded from the notion of an ordinary language and Its !llocutions
in any circumstance. The conclusion is one that dismisses the
perforreance of any performative unless It Is the dellberatlon of both
its fellclties and lnfellctties, rather than an lllocutlonary type decided
by •exclusion. As Derrtda states, '[!)he parasitic structure Is what I
have tried to analyze everywhere, under the names of writing, mark,
step [marche], margin, d![ferance, graft, undecidable, supplement,
pharmakon, hymen, parergon, etc.' (L!rn. 1979:247).
Derrlda (Signature, Event, Context .. or Sec. 1979) can thereby
argue that to classify writing as a parasitic dependant of speech
Ulumlnates the fundamental position which Austin holds to the truth
value of speech over wrltir.g, a belief upheld In a history of western
philosophy where speech Is closer to the real than writing, and where
speech Is the proper vehicle for the dellvery of knowledge and truth, as
well as being that which Is the most fruitful Investigation for
understanding communication. But, as we are aware by the
roststructural strategy towards language, both speech and writing
function In a relationship that Is dependent on the tterablllty of the
grapheme In a multipllcity of contexts because both speech and
writing are the products of signatures, marked and remarked, In a
system of d![ferance rather than the singular purity of stgns and
concepts. And so, In the hierarchy (speech/ writing), both performattve
modes exist by the warring forces of slgnlllcation In a playful system,
or langue, whe: , such warring Is equal to the shift that can mark a
felicity an Infelicity.
What Derrlda wants to affirm Is that parole, or speech,
10

functions no differently from writing due to the grapheme's ab!llty to
play within, and reiterate, a multiplicity of contexts. Petrey states that
'parts of "Signature, Event, Context" repeat Derrlda's conviction that
problems on the locutlonary level must be addressed before the
lllocutlonary level can be productively approached' ( 1990: 139).
Because writing Is first and foremost a graphematlc, or quotable,
signifier In a narcissistic performance rather than a locutlonary one,
speech Itself, by Its signatory tie to Its graphematlc state, Is able to be
extracted from codes and contexts only to be Injected, with surgical
precision. IntO other codes and contexts, thus acquiring a multipilclty
of meanings by a potential play In a multiplicity of lllocutlons.
Norris (1987: 178) mal<es this point quite clear when he has
recourse to Derrlda's ab!Uty, In 'Limited Inc., abc .. .', to extract, and
Inject Into other contexts, large sections of Searle's essay, 'Reiterating
the Differences: a reply to Derrlda', so he can prove his point that
performativlty In language, whether written or spoken, Is always faced
with the danger of slipping back to Its graphematlc level rather than
maintaining, as Searle would have It, the !llocutlonary level of a single
context. Thus the analysis of a serious performance must acknowledge
its debt to its non-serious counterpart if it is to avoid a performative
misfire, or Infelicity, as discussed by Austin (1962). What this further
means for us Is the need to address the quantum level of language
alongside our Investigation of Its larger structure, the subgenerlc
narrative, in order to maintain a closure that is relevant to the
common denominators between the two. As I have said earlier in this
Introduction, closure Is based on a dialogic state of Authority.
Much of Searle's 'Reiterating the Differences: a reply to Derr!da'
Is an argument that plays directly Into Derr!da's hands. Searle reads
Derrida in the same way as he had read Austin, and tries to dominate
h!s authority In the realm of speech act theory. Searle's downfall Is
due to his overt desire not to understand the Implications of
poststructural!sm and language, writing It off as a misreading of
Austin. In this sense, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) remains quite adamant
that, If one Is to constru ot a general speech act theory of ordinary
langnage use and Its felicitous and lnfellcltlous performances, then
one should not be analysing the parasites, such as fiction or theatre,
of ordinary language.
Aligning himself with Austin, Searle (Reply. 1979:204) reiterates
the problem of an actor making a promise on stage by stating that an
11
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audience does not hold the actor responsible for that promise, once
the performance Is over. To say that the actor Is logically pretending to
make a promise Is not the same as saytng that the rules of making a
promise In speech act theory are Inapplicable to literature. The
audience knows that the performance of the play will end within a
specific, Unear, tlmespace, and that In this sense It may be
pretending, but this does not preclude the audience from
understanding that the character has made a promise of a certain
lllocuttonary type. and that he or she Is Uable to social conventions
during the tlmespace that marks the literary reality of the play. This Is
equally Derrtda's point (Lim. 1979:231) and to this end, speech act
theory needs to Include, as I have continually suggested, the parasite
within Its explanatory scope and power.
Ommundsen (1993:3), discussing the self-reflexive status of
texts, also points out that some texts clearly have an Impact on the
extra-literary reality, the most recent being Salman Rushdle's The
Satanic Verses. That ts rather an impossible feat for a non·serlous
parasite In the Searlean scheme of things where Its logical status Is
simply that of lllocutlonary pretending. In such a case, the binary
opposition of ordinary I parasite, or serious/ non-serious, Is clearly
demolished and speech act theory must Include fictional discourse, Its
felicities and Infelicities, to the very same doctrinal rtgour that It
carries out In classifying the lllocu tlonary force and act of serious
discourse In the extra-literary reality.
Finally, the charge made by Fish (1980:221. 227. 244) that
speech act theory Is only applicable to speech act texts, seems to both
Petrey (1990: I 01) and me to be an enforced limitation placed on the
potential scope and power of the theory's explar.atory principles. Fish
argues that while 'a speech-act analysts of such texts will always be
possible, It will also be trivial (a mere list of the occurrence or
distribution of the kinds of acts), because. while It Is the conditions of
tntelllgtblllty that make all texts possible, not all texts are about those
conditions' (1980:245). Fish proves his point by a rigid, Searlean.
speech act analysts of Shakespeare's Coriolanus, concluding that
'Coriolanus Is about these conditions, and It goes the theory one better
by also being about their fraglllty' (1980:245).
Readers will note the emphasis I place on the Searlean aspect of
Fish's analysts, with which we are famlllar enough by now to know
that It places many restrictions not only on the literary text, but also

on the theory In general because of the exclusion of the parasitic
perform.-cmce. If Fish Is convinced that not all texts are about speech
act conditions, then Is he also convinced that not all ordinary
utterances are about speech act conditions? Speech act theory Is more
concerned with illuminating the types of illocutlonary forces Issued
during particular utterances In a performance rather than just
analysing speech acts which overtly display their felicitous conditions.
Furthermore, this type of an Investigation does not necessarily need to
be wholly confined to a list of illocutlons In ordinary language
circumstances, because such a confinement will generally be based on
an exclusion of other poseible felicities and Infelicities. or
appropriateness conditions. of an act In Its variant performances.
Indeed, my position Is marked by the appllcab1lity of speech act
theory to literary discourse and the subgenres In which It participates.
It Is my contention that speech act theory Is more applicable to, and
Identifiable with, fictional discourse than It Is with ordinary
discourse. This Is because the 'appropriateness conditions· (Pratt,
1977) for a particular performance are readily Identifiable with the
subgenerlc narratives from they seem to play originally, and because
the narratives under investigation tend to be much more conducive to
the felicities and Infelicities needed as evidence prior to classifYing an
illocution.
A speech act theorist has more accessible information when he
or she Is dealing with a text than when he or she Is dealing with
classifying an act in a social circumstance between two unknown
speakers in the immediacy of dynamic performances in a conversation.
Thus the text bears a multiplicity of appropriateness conditions. both
of a practlcBl type and a subgenerlc type, which will determine the
illocutlons of subgenerlc indicators. We will begin our journey with
the subgenerlc type of appropriateness conditions as a rich source of
Identifying and qualifYing the types of illocutlons In parasitical
utterances. This amounts to a mulUcontextualtty in performance that
Is not only foregrounded In the subgenre called magic realism, but
also common to allsubgenres, known and unknown.
While I wtll not debate Fish's point any further here, I hope that
readers will find sufficient evidence In the thesis as to why speech act
theory Is useful In a literary context, and why the authority of the
theory should not be placed just In the hands of a select few, such as
John. R. Searle. Under such circumstances, the theory Is In danger of
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dying In a rather narrow context and, If the current state of literary
criticism Is any indication, the death of speech act theory In a
fictional, or parasitic context, has been rather swift and well
sustained. Speech act theory should be placed In an Interpretative
environment where Austinlan principles can be openly debated within
the context of both the ordinary and parasitic performances as they
apply to the authority of Interpretative communities.
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O..e: Appi'Opliateness Conditions: 'Report on the Shad.ow Industry'.

Having outlined our position as to the principles of speech act
theory In parasitic discourse, we must address another Important
preliminary. We need to define a subgenertc concept Insofar as we can
explore both Its 'graphematlc' playfulness and Its ablllty to execute
closure by nature of the appropriateness conditions In Hs
construction. It Is only until we have come to some agreed upon
understanding of the concept of magtc realtsm, by Us 'shadows', that
we can proceed to discuss its operative nature as one type of parasitic
speech act In the myriad of subgenertc acts and their appropriateness
condltlons. Pratt states that '[o]ne of the most obvious kinds of
contextual information we bring to bear In confronting a literary work
Is our knowledge of Us genre .... [G ]enres and subgenres can to a great
extent be defined as systems of appropriateness conditions' (1977:86).
And Todorov argues that '[a] new genre Is always the transformation of
an earlier one, or of several: by Inversion, by displacement, by
combtnation .... There has never been a literature without genres; 1t is a
system In constant transformation .. .' [1990:15).
Todorov's notion of genre and subgenre differs from our usage of
the two terms as outlined In the Introduction. For Todorov [1973), the
notion of genre Is synonomous with both media and propositional
content, whereas his subgenrc is a mixture of the conditions of two
genres that combine to form an Interactive variant of the main gt.~nre
under Investigation. This scenario will be further lllumlnateCI In
chapter two when we discuss the fantastic indicator. For us, however,
the term genre Is synonomous with the notion of media, and the tenn
subgenre with propositional content Thus what we are proposing to
Investigate In this chapter, and also the thesis, Is how subgenerlc
magic realism, as the propositional content of the contactjunctton, can
place certain demands on the Author Function's intentions in
narrative, and how those intentions translate to the Reader Function
by way of Indicators and appropriateness conditions In the narrative.
As Sage states of the Carey narrative, '[wJhen the whole collection Is
laid end to end ... [lt is] striking how continuous, and continuously
famlllar, the baste terrain Is' [ 1995:19. My Italics).
Furthermore, this chapter examines, through magic realism,
how subgenres constitute themselves, by way of appropriateness
condltlons, because the system undergoes constant transformations.
15
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And since It Is a system In constant transformation, the conditions
can slip from the larger subgenerlc structures Into the graphematic, or
quantum, level of language, only to reinstate themselves In other
larger structures as subgenerlc Indicators. This notion Is of primary
Importance to this thesis.
Dealing, then, with magic realism as a subgene11c concept, our
focus Is to Illuminate Its appropriateness conditions and how they are
grounded In the mu!Upllclty of subgenerlc acts, rather than existing as
exclusive conditions of some idealistic subgenre. Instead of defining the
concept in a reductive sense, I intend to explore some of its
capabilities as a subgenre by the techniques it appropriates and
validates In the course of its narrative potential. One Important point
to bear In mind with the concept of magic realism Is Illuminated by
Linda Kenyon (1985) who argues that both words In the term must
have equal weight In order for one to understand that the subgenre Is
firmly grounded In realism. and not some type of magtcal writing of
and for Itself. Because there Is no firm definition of magic realism, the
term tends to be considered problematic. The majority of crltlcs and
theorists do not specialize In attempting to Illuminate Its principles,
and use it, as they use most polemic labels, as a casual reference.
Since confusion of the term occurs, casual references cannot
but construct magic realism's Infantile conceptuality Into a less than
attractive, subgenerlc package for people, like Peter Carey, who do not
Intend to do battle on the polemic field of literary theories. In these
circumstances, the concept generally tends to be either forgotten or
abandoned altogether, and an Author Function's ability to use the
subgenerlc concept can become seriously damaged. As Carey states, 'I
liked the term magtc reailsm when I first heard it .... Then later it
became a tag that was thrown around so much thalli started to get
soiled. In my mind it became a sort of cheap cliche. I became wary of
being labeled a magtc realist. In a funny way I no longer feel that I am
writing in this way .... It's less magic, more real (W!llbanks,l991:55·56.
My italics). Although Carey's statement Is relative to a discussion of
his novels, It can also be considered appropriate to his short stories.
In an earlier lnterv1ew with Craig Munro (1977:186), Carey Is quite
adamant about liking to begin W1th either reality, or an extension of
reality, In his short stories, so that he can work his way Into
fabullsm. And In a later lnterv1ew with John Maddocks, Carey states
that:
16

As tar as fm concerned II\Y stories are all set In the present, with llttle

tricks and mere =uses to Imke peop'e accept them Basi<'aJiy rm
always wrttlng about how the work! Is now. Ojten charocters are
dm!l'. viurflreull!fe, wrllhey are tn the relallvely sunrol,less mlumllsli:
sta1es as much as tn the more ratumUstr ones ....It's just II\Y way of
looking at the world. fm just bying to klok at It more clearly. Uke If
you put your head between your legs and look at the work! up>kle
down, evecythlng seems at onre the same and}<'! the cok>urs "F..Il
Imre Intense. You see It slightly dlli:ren~ and that's all fm bying to
do In the short stories (1981:38-39. My ltalk:s).

For our purposes, both these statements made by Carey come as
close to an understanding of magic realism as any. When Carey states
that his writing Is 'less magic, more real', and so removed from the
constraints of a cliched label like magic realism, It Is hard to agree
with Carey that he has actually moved beyond the subgenre he
believes to be 'soiled'. This seems to be particularly apt when we
consider that his working principle Is to begin with reality, or an
extension of reality, In order to move toward a technique used In
magic realism, namely fabulation, which I will discuss later In the
chapter. Indeed, the fact that the stories portray both character and
situation in a combination of surrealism and naturalism indicates
that the appropriateness conditions work to broaden the Reader
Function's understanding of his or her !nd!Vldual perspectives to
reality. The stories, therefore, ground themselves, by the demands of
magic realism, in the C.ual semantic importance. stressed by Kenyon,
of magic and reality.
Nevertheless, Carey does allude to the legitimate point about
the way tn which critics can misunderstand their positions vls-i'l.-v!s
the subgenre, or any categorical term for that matter, by preferring to
validate their own critical position of the term rather than attempting
to understand it. For, If one employs categorical labels, then one must
equally explain their usage, not only In one's own discourse, but also
within tile discursive context of another. As we stated In the
Introduction, with the help of M. M. Bakhttn (1981), our notion of the
production and transference of meaning Is based on a dialogic state of
Authority. An absence of Investigative thought by the dialogic state of
Authority can lead to an equal absence In understanding that
17
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concepts and utterances do have conditions which render them
particular to a group, type, or larger structure. This has added to the
current confusion not just over magic realism, but also evecy other
term. When terms such as fabullsm, metaftctlonality, postmodem!Sm,
and postcolonlallsm are taken to be synonymic explanations of magic
realism, literacy critics are, In fact, articulating quite separate
concepts and practices In their casual references to explain Carey's
subgenertc performances.
What, then, are we dealing with? Let us consider first an extract
from Carey's 'Report on the Shadow lndustcy' for an understanding of
magic realism as subgenre and concept;
"You see !IDJlle tn daJk glasses wandertng;:uound the supennarkets
at 2 AM. There are ~t lx:!xffi an akmg the aLsles, some as expen.sM!
as 8fiy dollars but most of them only IM. There's always Muzak. It
gJres me the shlts more than the shadows. The people don~ klok at
one another. They come to l:rowse through the lx:!xffi of shadows
although the packets g).Ve no tndlcatbn ofwhafs tnsi:le..." (1974:91).
De Reyna states that '[t[he magic reallst approach holds a
"mirror up to nature" to record the minutest detail ... it doesn't "dece~ve
the eye": It enchants the eye [1973:9). It Is this attention to
'meticulous detail that Is the hallmark of magic reallsm' ( 1979:9).
From De Reyna's position, magic realism does not seem far removed
from the traditional understanding of reallsm. However, it is this
focus on 'meticulous detail' that allows the magic realist speech act to
indulge In the fantastical nature of the environment depleted by the
narrative while simultaneously grounding such a movement wholly
within the literacy and extra-literacy boundaries of both Author
Function and Reader Function. It Is thts movement, this synecdochic
enchantment, that captures the mind's eye of the Reader Function by
the narrative potential laid down by the Author Function. The
synecdochic enchantment of magic realism Is the quality by which a
meticulous attention to detall relfies both realism and Its microcosmic
magic, represented In the narrative, through the artistic
substantiation of culture, as the base principle 'If the subgenre. It Is by
the demands of this base principle that the enchantment within the
narrative structure Is an orchestrated reflection of the structures and
culturallsms, both popular an1 traditional, which occur In the
18
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heteroglot of the social strata. This indicates that what is common to
the 'real' of the Reader Function is also common to that which
constitutes reality within the text. As Baker states, '[r]eallstic detail is
essential to magic realism, for, without the presence of a realistic
framework, the story would become pure fantasy' (1991 :58).
If we consider the extract from Carey's story with this in mind,
we can see how the realist aspect of magic realism makes space for a
detailed focus on the reality of the supermarket, on the 'great boxes
all along the aisles', and the fantastic nature of the shadows within,
not only as a commodity for people to consume, but also as a
synecdochic enchantment of that which is 'normally' the co~ortable
and unquestioned position of the Reader Function to the 'real'. This
synecdochic enchantment creates a timespace where the thing, which,
in the case cf Carey's story, is the product or 'shadow', ls necessarily
foregrounded by the fact that it is capable of havtng a reality equal to
our own, and can assume as many positions to the 'real' as our own.
Patterson argues that 'the viewer, so llluminated, receives affirmation
of an equal reality, sees and therefore is. Magic realist art, sometimes,
shows us the world this way' (1986:29).
Thus it is not just Uie notion of consumers consuming shadows
that is re!lled by the synecdochic enchantment of the supermarket and
its aisles of products, but also the knowledge that Reader Functions
can themselves be consumed by the shadows in exactly the same
circumstances. For is it not true that supermarkets, in the extraliterary reality, are lined with a myriad of boxes which advertise their
own appeal as commodity, and equally their own reality, above all
else? In fact, the focus on shadows as an unquestionably acceptable
commodity seems to indicate that the subgenre, while depicting the
magic of the scenario, is not far removed from that which occurs in
the 'real'. One might say that magic realism gets closer to the 'real'
than realism w!thtn the context of narratology.
While the above argument Identifies the base principle of Magic
realism, there Is still some confusion within the subgenre that needs
to be addressed. In particular, those concepts and practices which are
often considered to be synonymic equivalents of magic realism, but
which are, In fact, more accurately described as literary techniques or
ntra-lfterary conditions which the subgenre can employ as subgeneric
indicators, based on their appropriateness conditions, for its specific type
of speech acts. Hancock identifies, for our purposes, the following
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features which are central to an understanding of magic reallsm as
subgenre: 'a labyrinthine awareness of other books: the use of fantasy
to cast doubt on the nature of reallty: an absurd re-creation of
"history"; a meta-fictional awareness of the process of fiction making:
a reminder of the mysteriousness of the literary lmaglnatlon at work:
a collective sense of folkloric past (1986:36).
Primarily, the main terms which are equivalent to Hancock's list
of features, and which I believe have been misunderstood not only as a
synonymic equivalent for magic realism but as subgenres In
themselves, are postmodernlsm, postcolonlallsm, fabulation, and
metallctlonallty. It Is my contention that the first two are conditions
specifically related to the extra-literary environment and Its
narratologlcal apprehension by the subject-centred consciousness,
and that the remaining two are techniques which an Author Function
can use within a llterary reality by choice, but he or she does not
necessarily need to do so In order for the narrative to be maglc-reallst.
A discussion of subgenertc techniques almost always precedes
the search for a subgenerlc definition. Although I am putting forth the
proposition that Carey's short stories are magic-realist by the
techniques discussed above, I must also address the notion that
Carey's short stories could be mistakenly considered by some as
products of subgenertc science fiction. This mistake has been made by
Mellors, who categoriZes The Fat Man in HistonJ as 'a collection of scl-fi
short stories first published ln Australia ln 1974' (1991:89). Rabkin
states that 'a work belongs in the genre of science fiction if its
narrative world is at least somewhat differeni from our own. and tf
that difference is apparent against a background of an organized body
of knowledge (1976:119). Turner argues that Carey falls under hls
neologism of 'parafictlon' (1988:15) and Is therefore a 'user of science
fiction, not a (sublgenre writer' (1988:21 ). And Van lkln states that,
'Carey's subject matter ls similar to that which one would expect to
find ln science fiction. But unllke the average science fiction writer,
Carey does noi strive to prove the sclentlflc validity of hls
extrapolations (1977:20. My Italics).
If a work Is to be considered science fiction, It must valldate
that which ls not koown on the basis of that which ls. In other words,
the fantastic nature of the narrative must not only be valldated "1thln
some existing body of knowledge, but must also be able to exist by the
logical explanation of that body of knowledge. Although Carey Is not a
20

science fiction writer, but a user of the subgenre. It Is Important to
bear this In mind because such a use forms the base principle of the
lriferentheme. Besides an affiliation with the epistemological factor of
science fiction, another reason for my formulating the concept of the
lnjerentheme comes from two Interviews with Peter Carey. In both Van
!kin (1977:31) and Attwood (1988:56), Carey speaks of developing
themes and characters to progressive, logical extremes. That Is to say,
the lnferentheme Is the progression of a narrative theme pushed to a
logical extremity by the presence of accepted bodies of knowledge.
The theme Itself Is not validated by those bodies of knowledge,
but relfled In much the same manner as the base principle of
synecdochic enchantment reifies the common ground between literary
and extra-literary realities through an equal representatlun of realism
and magic that exists In both. For the narrative theme Is still
essentially served on a metaphoric platter to the Reader Function, but
It Is garnished with that type of knowledge wtth which the Reader
Function ts ··uniltar. and can therefore actept as the logical
accompanir.Jcut which makes comfortable the progressive distance
between him or her and the Inferential spatiality of the theme In
question. The objective Is to make the theme mysteriously palatable.
Examples of the lnferenthemc can be found In the following extracts
from the 'Report on the Shadow Industry'. where the narrator states
that:
There are a few who say the smoke is dangerous because of
carctnogcnlc chemicals used In U1c manufucture of shadows
(1974:91).
Others argue that the shadow Is a natural prnduct and by Its vcry
nature ehemJcal1y pme (1974:92).
Tile Bureau ofStat1stlcs reveals that the a\~ househokler spends
25 per cent of his Income on these expensive g:xxts and Umt U!ls
fCIOenlagetncreas<sasfuelnoomed...cn:ases(J974:92).
1l1ere ls... research to Indicate that fue high sutlle rate In advanced
oounliif's Is connected with fue populartty of slmdows and that thele
Is a direct statlstleal correlatiOn between shadow sales and surlde
rates(l974:92).

The above quotations Indicate that, while Carey does participate
In scientific explanations of the perlocutlonary nature of the shadows,
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he does not validate the fantastic nature of the shadows themselves.
What we have. therefore, Is the ability for an Author Function to
participate, by degree, In the techniques normally associated with
science fiction through the lnferentheme's ability to rel(y the realism
of the narrative while simultaneously leaving the central, thematic,
element, the shadows, In a state of metaphoric play. If we consider the
synecdochic enchantment of magic realism as subgenre. the mirroring
of the extra-llt.,rary reality In the narrative occurs by the focus on
specific and meticulous details which accompany the event. This, In
turn, qualifies both the realism of a thing through the scientific
explanation of Its effect, and the fantastic nature of the thing-In-Itself
by the total acceptlblllly of Its Incomprehensible essentialism In both
the literary and extra-literary environments.
The tnferentheme. therefore. makes the mysterious mysteriously
palatable, and organizes the metaphoric quality of the shadows
against an acceptable body of knowledge. As Van !kin states, 'Carey
establishes that the shadows are produced by a technological process,
but he does not allow his acc0unt to become bogged in '""'~seudo~
technical Jargon' ( 1977:20). Magtc realism thereby allows the Author
Function to get 'away with labyrinthine constructions by unifying the
narrative with a voice that never q· ~sttons what tt [fantastically} tells'
(Hancock, 1986:42).
Since magic realism never questions the fantastic essentialism
of its narrative, we must consider the notion of fabulation. Both

Green { 1975} and Graernc Turner ( 19861 seem to sec Carey's short
fiction as fabulation. While Green docs not cite a definition for the
term. he does state that Carey's fiction has 'an autonomous "reality"

which adds to our commonly perceived reality ( 1975:74.). I find this
explanation of fabulation unsatisfactory simply because It seems to be
an applicable possibility for all subgenrcs known to the Reader
Function In the history of narrative. Turner, however, grounds his usc
of the term In the definition of Robert Scholes by stating that
'fabulation is defined, unhelpjully ... as "ethically controlled fantasy",
revealing the contemporary 'plunge back into the tide of the story"'
(1986:432. My italics). Both uses of the term fabulation, especially In
Turner's case, are unhelpful simply because one cannot distinguish
between technique or subgenre. Even Scholes himself, by the
definition of 'ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3), would seem to
argue for fabulation as subgenre, and he does so by Invoking the Fable
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as an example designed to illuminate that subgenerlc status. However,
the mistake made In this definition of fabulation Is one that Is also
quite common to fantasy and the fantastic, and can be simply
rectified by an appropriate recourse to the base principles of the actual
subgenres, namely Fable and Fantasy respectively.
I have therefore proposed that fabulation Is a technique, and
not a subgenre In Itself. In fact, when one considers It as a technique,
the confusion surrounding the term Itself becomes less problematic
and so renders the term more accessible. Scholes argues that
' ... modern fabulation, like the ancient fabling of Aesop, tends away
from direct representation of the surface of reality but returns toward
actual human life by way of ethically controlled fantasy' (1979:3. My
Italics). This Is the 'plunge back Into the tide of the story' (Scholes,
1979:25)) that Turner ( 1986:432) considered so confusing as a
subgenerlc definition. And Turner Is quite right to be confused simply
because technique has been mistaken for subgenre. If we consider, for
the moment, the relationship between Fable and fabulation, In
comparison with Fantasy and the fantastic, then we can see that one
Is axiomatically dependent upon the base principles of the subgenre.
Indeed, what we consider to be fantastic ln magic realism,
science fiction, or any subgenre for that matter, is dependent upon
our knowledge, as Reader Functions, of the base principle of that
subgenre called Fantasy. It Is my contention that fabulation works In
more or less the same manner by its axiomatic dependency on the
subgenerlc Fable and the art of fabling. In that sense, then, It Is a
technique that exlstsjor the Author Function's use by a dialogic link to the
base principle of the subgenerlc Fable, and In this manner can the Author
Function ground the narrative, by the value question inherent In all ethical
deliberations, firmly within the extra-literary environment qf the Reader
Function. Magic realism, when It uses the fabulist technique, makes Its

connections between literary and extra-literary environments a
definitive process of consideration, and can thereby force the Reader
Function to consider the ethics of the inferentheme.
Let us consider an extract from 'Report on the Shadow
Industry':
My own lather left home because of somethlng he had seen In a ba><

of shadows. It wasn't an expensive OOx, either, qUite the opposite -a
l1ttle swprtse my mother had bought with the money left <Ner from
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her housekeq:mg. He opened it after dinner one Frt:lay night and he

was gone beilre I came down to l:realmst on the Satwday. He lelt a

note wbk:h my mother onlY sh<Mffi me ""Y recently. My father was
not g:lOd With words and had tmuble oommunlcatlng what he had
seen: 'Words cannot EJqress It What I Feel Because of The Things I
Sawin The BaxOfShadowsYou Bought Me." (1974:93).
While In the preVIous extract we discussed the science fictional
validation of the shadows' perlocutlonary effects, It Is here that we
enter another realm of the shadows' perlocutlon, through !he fabulist
technique, In both the literary and extra-literary reality. That Is to say,
the value of a shadow, as an lnferentheme, Is questioned by the fact
that Its effect on IndiViduals, who both encounter and use them as a
commod.!ty, tends to fragment what was preVIously considered to be a
stable element of the 'real'. Indeed, the shadows' abilities to Implicate
the IndiVIdual In some sort of metaphysical struggle between good and
evil, between known and unknown, and between hopes and fears
Indicate an educative quality and dialogic llnk to the classic
moralisms and Ulocuttonary force of Fables. For fabulation, this
Indicates the technique's ability to orchestrate the performance of Its
speech acts with the atm of achieVIng a specified ethical closure ln the
production and transference of meaning.
It ls this potential of the fabullsl technique, wllhln u.aglc
realism, that has led critics like Bliss (1991 ). Mellors (1991 ), and Sage
(1995). as Reader Functions, lo approach Carey with the possibility,
as well as the Intention, of producing morallsl readings of his
narratives. And lt ls the fabullst teclmlque, ln magic realism, that
creates a space for Carey, as Author Function, to inject his narratives
wlth a moral flavour that ls 'moulded out of the Christian mode'
(Sibree, 1991:5). As Carey has stated In an Interview with Tausky,
'even though I am not a Christian, there are many things about
Christianity which are attractive' (1990:34).
There ls another dimension to fabulation of which Scholes
makes us aware, and whtch we must discuss here. Scholes states that
'In the present volume !Fabulation and Met<YJct!on], I have tried to
attend more thoroughly to the experimental or metajlcttonaldlmenslon
Q{modernfabulatton' (1979:4). With metafictlonallty defined as 'fiction
about fiction' (Turner, 1986:432). It would seem that, for Scholes,
fabulation Is a subgenre where the Author Function can participate In
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that dimension of modern narrative called metaflctlonallty.
However, as I have already argued, fabulation Is approprtately
classlfled as a technique. We can, therefore, perform the following
move. Because Scholes classifles metaftctionallty as a dimension, we
can take It one step further and propose that metaflctlonallty Is "
technique based upon the reflexivity that Is 'present In all texts and
central to all literary analysts; a function which, by analysing literary
processes, enables us to understand the processes by which we read
the world as text' (Ommundsen, 1993:4). The reason we may call it a
technique, or function, or even a dimension, is simply because
metaflctlonallty Is an Inherent property of all texts and all
narrataloglcal processes. But because It can be deliberately emplvyed
by the Author Function as a narrative stratagem, It Is a technique
that overtly determines the direction In which the Reader Function
reads the Intentionality of sense and reference within the context of a
production and transference of meaning from text to Reader Function.
Ommundsen warns, however, that 'if we restrict the category
'reflexive fiction' to texts that are overt or explicit In their reflexive
commentary, and the adjective 'reflexive' to statements about wrttlng
and art only, we Impose scrtous limitations, not only on 'reflexivity' as
such. but also on the fictional text's potential for meaning' (1993: 18).
Nevertheless, metaflctlonallty Is a dimension common to all
subgencrlc texts, and generic media. But within a text that docs not
overtly employ the metaflctlonal technique, or does not overtly
foreground Its metaflctlonal status, the Reader Function can only
consider the text's metaflctlonallty If he or she has the theoretical
competence to do so. Otherwise, the text's metaflctlonal status wlll go
totally unnoticed. In the text which overtly plays with Its
metaflctlonallty, such metaflctlonality Is foregrounded by the Author
Function's Intentional Injecting of the metaflctional technique within
whatever subgenertc styllstlcs he or she Is wrttlng.
Consider the following from 'Report on the Shadow Industry'
within the context of metaftctlonality:
My own teelings a!:out the shadows are amltvalent, to say the least

For here I have manufactured one more: elusive, unsatlsfactory,
htotlng at greater beauties and more profound nzysterles that exist
somewhere before the beglnnlng and somewhere after the end
(1974:94).
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Ommundsen argues that a metaflctlonal text 'may refuse to
comply with expectations set up by the (sub]genre to which It belongs'
(1993:9). In the case of Carey and magic realism In the above, the
metaflctlonal!ty complies exactly with the base principle of the
subgenre, one In whtch both synecdochic enchantment and the
ground rules set up by the narrative are reversed at some point during
the narrative. As Rabkin states, '(e]very work of art sets up Its own
ground rules. The perspectives that the fantastic contradicts are
perspectives legitimized by those Internal ground rules (1976:4-5). I
will discuss Rabkin's notion further In Chapter Two when we explore
Carey's 'Peeling'.
In the case of 'Report on Shadow Industry' and the
inferentheme, such a reversal occurs in the above extract when the
narrator logically transgresses from reporter of the shadows as
commodity to the metaphysical status of manufacturer of shadows.
And on the metaflctlonal level of the narrative as written signatures,
the narrator transgresses from being a Reader Function of those
signatures, the shadows, to an Author Function of their production In
much the same way as the shift that occurs from Reader Function to
Author Function when we write our 'reports' of the narrative. Thus the
metaflctlonal technique, In thts Instance, allows the Author Function
to Invoke the appropriateness conditions necessary for the reversal to
occur. And If we consider the fabulist technique within this con text,
the narrative of 'Report on the Shadow Industry' becomes a magic
realist speech act which demands that we, as Reader Function,
consider the ethical value of such a manufactured product. Hancock
(1986:47) states that magic realism does nothing stmp:er than produce
an alternative to the question of reality, asking readers not to
consider what Is before them but what It Is they want before them.
One may begin to wonder why all the Information relayed 1n the
above argument ts not simply considered as a mtnute breakdown of
that whtch charactertzes the postcolonial and postmodem narrative,
rather than that of magtc realism. It ts a rather dlfflcult dtstlnctton to
make If one persists In categortztng every styllsttc execution occurring
tn narrative as a subgenre tn and of Itself. Within the context of
postmodemlsm, Hawthorne states that '(t(wo relateci terms describing
postmodern!st fiction are fabulation and surflctton. Both terms Imply
an aggressive and playful luxurlatlon In the non-representational, In
whtch the writer takes delight In the artifice of wrtting rather than In
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using writing to describe or make contact with a perceived extra·
fictional reality' (1992:111). For Hawthorne, the subgenre Is
postmoderntsm, and Its synonymic descriptions are fabulation and
surflctlon. Indeed, with fabulation, Hawthorne Is quite adamant that
It helps to solidify that break with an extra-fictional reality which Is
the hallmark of postmodernlsm. This Is, of course, plainly false. If
fabulation Is ethically controlled, can It not but make contact with
some aspect of an extra-fictional reality?
One can begin to see the distance between what Is
postmodernlst, and what Is magic realist. Indeed, the distance
between postmodernlsm and magic realism Is such that they rarely
meet In the boundaries of a critical discourse, and when they do, there
tends to be more confusion than understanding. The problem Is one
that 3tems primarily from a categorical misappropriation, by the
critics, of postmodernlsm as both condition and subgenre, rather than
as a condition alone. I do not de~~Y iiiat postmodernism can filter
through, or be Invoked Intentionally, within a narrative structure, but
It tends to lend Itself to a variety of subgenres rather than one of Its
own making. While Lyotard (1992:124) will argue that the postmodern
writer does not work with any singular base principle, and cannot be
read, therefore, with a definitive set of rules In mind, his argument Is
based on the hidden assumption that postmodernlsm does not
function as a subgenre, and has no inherent intention of being
constructed as one because it rejects the singular and organizing
operativeness of a base principle. This is, of course, far removed from
the subgenre of magic realism, because it does have an organizing
base principle of synecdochic enchantment, which stipulates and
regulates the primary direction of the narrative and Its speech acts.
Easthope and McGowan state that 'while the forms of ('aStiche,
self-referential and explicitly lntertextual "style" of postmodernism
owes something to the mode of modernism, they do, none the less,
also break with the referent of the real (history, time, art and the
artist) which modernism maintained' (1992:182). Once again It Is
apparent that postmodernlsm breaks with that which appropriates
subgenerlc distinctions by severing Itself from a limiting base
principle, and so lends Itself readily to the potential of the pastiche of
base principles, ultimately denying essential!stic truth and value to a
single thing or process. Waugh (1992:3) states that postmodernlsm Is
a condition as well as a mood, characterized by the sense of an ending,
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that has transgressed from the boundaries of the aesthetic and art
into those traditionally believed to be stable areas of reality, namely
science, cognition, and morality. As Hutcheon (1988) argues,
postmodemism Is a condition where the aesthetics of modernism
leaves the boundaries of the text behind and transgresses uncertatnty
Into all that which we had assumed was a stable, knowledgeable
reality.
All In all, despite the fact that both the subgenre of magic
realism and the postmodern condition may tend to exist by the same
techniques, the sense of an ending and the textual affinity to an
exira-literary reality are Important distinctions between magic realism
and postmodernlsm. The magic realist subgenre may Invoke the
postmodern condition but It does not wholly and exclusively
participate In the apocalyptic elimination of both literary and extra·
literary realities. To illustrate this further within speech act
principles, magic realism operates and organizes Itself specifically
within the performativlty of !llocutlonary force and closure, while the
postmodern condition cannot but exts t by the self-performativlty of
the grapheme, shifting the signatures from context to context.
To return to the extract from 'Report on the Shadow Industry',
the narrator, stating he has manufactured one more shadow, the
narrative of the report Itself. says that It hints 'at greater beauties and
more profound mysteries that exist somewhere before the beginning
and somewhere after the end' I 1974:94). If this were read within a
postmodern perspective, the greater beauties could very well l.Je
existence of the signatures, as pastiche, in the endless and open
perforrnatlvlty of a multiplicity of contexts. In magic realism. however.
Carey Is able to hint at possible realities which exist In a
metaphysically transcendent state to the Reader Function's notion of
time and space. This state is a type of reality which has an equal
truth and and equal value, In a closed context, to that reality which Is
commonly perceived as 'the real'. And once again, It Is the
metaflctlonal technique, In conjunction with the lnferentheme, that
qualifies this 'closed' sense and reference. For the story has both a
thematic beginning and a thematic end which In themselves
constitute a logically progressive reality by the ground rules of the
subgenre, based on accepted bodies of knowledge In the social
heteroglot, where the extra-literary reality of the Reader Function
exists both before and after the narrative has ended. The point being
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made by such a structural alignment between literary and extraliterary realities Is !hat beyond the extra-literary reality we know may
lie several other possible realities, as yet uncharted, which have
structural affinities of some kind to our own, and so may hint at
greater beauties and more profound mysteries not only In some
transcendent state, but also, and more Importantly, In our own.
0,1e methodology of Interpreting this multiplicity of realities,
waiting to be charted and Invented (or reinvented), Is the postcolonial
condition of both the literary and extra-literary realities. Much magic
realist writings have been, at some point or another, consldored
wholly from the postcolonial perspective. And we may further state
that, at Urnes, the distinction between p~~tcolonlality and magic
realism Is difficult to make. However, what Is needed In order to make
such a distinction Is exactly that which 1 have been arguing within
the context of postmodernlsm, and that Is the distinction between
cultural condition and subgenertc representation. Postcolonlallty Is a
condition In the extra-literary reality which proceeds to reinvent, or
bring to the forefront, those cultural realities which have been
marginalized by the persistent manufacturing of truth from one
dominant, empirical, culture. Ashcroft et a! (1989:2) argue that the
use of the term postcolonial is based on the notion that a multiplicity
of cultural realities In the world has been dismantled by the l!:uropean
aggression of imperial processes. And Adam art;ues that the
postcolonial Is a practice that gains Its Impetus from ·social and
political self assertlon'(l991:79).
As a practice, It Is the ability of individual writers to Illuminate
their condition of cultural marginalization primarily by narrative, and,
In this manner, can the condition Infiltrate the chosen subgenre of
the Author Function. The fact that an Author Function c"n take
magic realism as the subgenre of choice does not at all Imply that
magic realism Is always driven by a primary concern for postcolonial
Issues. An example of this Is some of the short fiction of Jorge Luis
Borges. Although the content of his short fiction does make
undeniable political statements about the nature of reality, It does
not necessarily always consider Itself with the question of Imperial
aggression and marginalization. As we can see In 'Report on the
Shadow Industry', a variety of techniques make their way Into the
Intentions and words of the Author Function but none of them overtly
Implies postcolonial politics as we have discussed In the above
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argument.
Indeed, the Issue of possible realities, borrowed from the
principles of what Is generally considered to be postcolonlallty, In
'Report on the Shadow Industry', Is an Issue not of marginalization
but of potentially greater understanding In the metaphysics of being If
and when we chart the uncharted. In some sense, one could argue
that this Interpretation of the story reaffirms the question of
Imperialism Into the unknown, but this would only be so If such an
undertaking refused to deliberate upon the question of equal realities
and their value Inherent In all things that pass through our own
'rear. We must chart the uncharted by the base principle of magic
realism, by synecdochic enchantment, In order for the nature of reality
to achieve a broader scope of truth. The point to be made here Is that
not all magic realist narratives are postcolonial. While they may
Include the principles of the postcolonial condition, It Is not necessary
for them to be artefacts of postcolontallty In order for them to be
examples of magic realism.
What does all this Imply for the magic realist su bgenre? Except
for Its base principle, they are all sufficient conditions for the speech
acts of a narrative to be classified as conditions appropriate to the
magic realist subgenre. Pratt (1977:204) states that readers expect and
Isolate the appropriateness conditions of a su bgenre In order to begin
their analysis of the speech act In question, decoding the text
according to Its directives, or Indicators. This has been the
fundamental principle of this chapter. Thomas reasons that the
sufficient condition 'for some situation is any circumstance or
condition whose existence or fulfillment, by itself, is enough to bring
about or guarantee tbe existence of that situation' (1986: 193). And, as
such, these techniques and conditions function as subgenerlc
Indicators when they are deployed within the narrative stratagem.

For example, both fabulation and metaflctlonality as magic
realist techniques based on appropriateness conditions, and the
postmodern and postcolonial extra.literary conditions or moods,
reconstitute themselves within the larger structure, upon deployment
In the narrative stratagem, as su bgenerlc Indicators with a relative
Ulocutionary force. That Is to say, every one of the aforementioned
techniques and conditions are enough, by themselves, to bring about
the state or existence of a magic realist speech act, but they do not
necessarily Imply that such an act has occurred. What this means Is
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that the aforementioned techniques and conditions lend themselves
readily to any subgenre and must be analysed according to the base
principle and ground rule regulations of that subgenre. As Thomas
argues. 'when a statement of sufficient conditions Is made. It Is very
Important that Its context be clearly stated or understood' (1986:194).
Within the context of magic realism, the base principle Is quite
simply one that foregrounds a relftcatton of realism by an attention to
meticulous detail In order for the progression of synecdochic
enchantment In that realism to occur. This progression allows the
Author Function to deploy the fantastic In a reversal of the narrative
ground rules on the basis of the sufficient ccndltion of the
lnferentheme. And the ground rule Is whatever Is thematically laid
down by the narrative, hence the lnferentheme, In either the monoglot
or heteroglot poles of literary and extra-literary acts. In this sense,
then, the base principle of a subgenre Is Its necessary condition.
Thomas states that a necessary condition 'for some situation Is any
circumstance or condition that needs to be fulfilled In order for that
situation to exist' (1986:194). Magic reallsm, therefore, cannot be
'magic realism' unless its necessary condition, its base principle of
synecdochic enchantment, Is considered as the logtcal necessity for Its
existence, and is considered as the organizing factor by wl:lch all
sufficient conditions, or appropriateness conditions, contribute to the
formulation of the larger structure of the su bgenre by their
reconstitution as subgenertc indicators with lllocutlonary forces.
Thus the narrator ln 'Report on the Shadow Industry', by the
reconstitution of the previously llsted appropriateness conditions In
the larger structure of the magic realist subgenre, becomes a producer
of shadows rather than a reporter of Its consumption, and the logical
progression towards the reversal of this ground rule has occurred
through the subgenertc Indicators and their lllocutionary forces In the
subgenre. The magic realist speech act Is happily executed.
And by such an execution we cannot but analyse the act within
the context of the performatlvity of an Ulocution unless we were to
ignore the two following important points. Firstly, since magic realism
partakes In the overt presence of a narrative organized around the
clo~1e-knit intricacy of a sjuzhet, its closure of sense and reference, and
Its transference of meaning occurs primarily by its abillty to ride the
Scholean 'tide of the story'. Indeed, as Dovey ( 1983:202) has stated,
the very presence of a sjuzhet In Carey's stories determines the need for
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an analysis of Indicators by the direction of the narrative's formal
structure as well as Its logically conclusive, but contradictory, endtng.
And secondly, when we consider the breakdown of Austin's (1971)
classic constatlve-performatlve distinction as a prtnclple that can lend
Itself to subgeneric tndlcators, we ftnd that no subgenerlc Indicators
are 'constatlve', and so none Is either true or false within the context
of their usage as an appropriateness condition for the magic realist
speech act.
All Indicators are performatlve, and so depend upon
appropriateness conditions for their successful, or felicitous,
performance as an act of a particular subgenre In question. For they
can readily lend themselves to the variform genres and su bgenres tn
both the monoglot and heteroglot poles. What Is fixed, however, for
the subgenre, Is the base principle because of Its status as necessary
condition, and because It organizes the appropriateness conditions as
subgenertc Indicators, with lllocutlonary force, to formulate the larger
structure of the subgenre Itself. It Is this factor of the magic realist
subgenre, In combination with both Rabkin's and Todorov's theories
of the fantastic, as sufficient condition, that I will discuss in the next
chapter.
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I!!!!;. The Fantastic Indicator: 'Peeling'.

We ended the first chapter on the note that our approprtateness
conditions are In fact synonomous, because of their perfonnative
nature, with their functiontng as subgenertc Indicators. Let us discuss
this In more detail. The approprtateness conditions, or subgenerlc
Indicators, most common to the magic reallst subgenre are the literary
conditions of fabulation, metaftctional!ty and the lnferentheme, and
the extra-literary conditions of poslmodernlsm, and postcolonlallsm.
Although this list will make do for the moment, there Is nothing to
stop the Reader Function from postulating another approprtateness
condition If such a condition helps to Illuminate the functioning of
the contextual margins through Its status as a subgenerlc Indicator.
As Derrlda states, 'a context Is never absolutely determinable
[and] Its determination can never be entirely certain or saturated'
(Sec, 1979:174). Put simply, no context Is able to be wholly determined
by what Is known about It, and no context Is so full as to be unable to
take on more than that which It already has within. The possibility of
expansion and addition within subgenres will always exist because the
appropriateness conditions are not contextually llnlte In themselves.
This Is, In fact, what we will be consldertng In this chapter when we
discuss the fantastic as another appropriateness condition and
subgenertc Indicator within the magic realist subgenre.
Petzold (1986) argues that each and every narrative should be
considered as a discursive mixture of both the realistic and the
fantastic. If we remember Kenyon's statement, the notion of this
'discursive mixture' is important to our argument. We remember that
there are no true centres to these concepts. and the ones we confront
are the ones we have posited as centre. Indeed, because subgeneric
Indicators are logically sufficient, their corre"pondtng appropriateness
condition can lend Itself readily to other subgenres. The subgenres
themselves, therefore, can be seen as a 'mixture', or compilation of
subgenerlc Indicators, based on the marglnallsm of their
corresponding appropriateness conditions, where each Indicator, with
Its own Ulocutlonary force, works toward the greater perlocutlonary
effect. The subgenre should not be seen as an essentially totalistic
body which Is never Impregnated with a foreign, subgenertc element.
With this In mind, It must be stated that the necessary
condition, or base principle of magic realism, synecdochic
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enchantment, llke any other base prtnclple, Is not a subgenerlc centre
even though It may seem to function as one. It Is an organizing
principle by which all appropriateness conditions operating within the
subgenre have their graphematlc forces harnessed, as subgeneric
Indicators, so that a greater, 'lllocuttonary' order Is posited on to an
always existing and microcosmic chaos. Wilson states that 'it]here
seems to be no single, free-standing, uncontaminated, pure text -only
the weaves and nets, the threads and the labyrinths of textuallty.
Stmllarly, there seems to be no pure, single-formed space In literature
(1986:73). He proceeds to argue that the category of magic realism Is a
plurality of worlds that 'always approach each other but never actually
merge· (1986"13).
By replacing 'worlds' with appropriateness conditions which, In
turn. originate from a plurality of contexts, Wilson's point Is rather
stmllar to our own, except for the notion that these 'worlds', or
appropriateness conditions, never actually merge. Indeed, on the level
of the subgenertc Indicator, they do appear to merge and actually
sustain an order by their being harnessed to the organizing Influence
of the base ptinclple. An organizing factor allows for the creation of a
larger structure by the Intentionality of the Author Function. But It Is
right to consider that such a merger Is not a once only event, and that
the larger subgeneric structure Is not an Isolated entity because It has
harnessed those ·graphematlc' forces of the appropriateness conditions
on the microcosmic level.
In this sense, then, the appropriateness condition functions
somewhat similarly to the grapheme that precedes the locution. It can
shift and play like the grapheme, executing a variety of semantic
forces that can be harnessed by the base principle of a subgenre In
order to consltute the appropriateness condition as a subgenerlc
Indicator. As a subgeneric Indicator, the appropriateness condition
exists on a level similar to that of the locution. In Its more
graphemat.lc state, It Is nothing more than an lterabie mark In a
multiplicity of subgeneric contexts. An appropriateness condiUon does
not exist In a singular and all-encompassing context, and so Its status as
subgenertc Indicator Is thereby always su.fficlent within one context.
Derrlda states that '(o)ne can perhaps come to recognise other
possibilities In It by Inscribing It or grafting It onto other chains. No
context can entirely close it. Nor can any code, the code here being
both the possibility and Impossibility of writing, of Its essential
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lterab!Uty (repetition/ alterlty)' (Sec, 1979: 182).
And, even though we are dealing with one structure, namely
magic realism, It Is the base principle of that subgenre, the meticulous
attention to detail, which Indicates to us that Its context Is not an
Isolated occurrence but a compilation of all those contexts In which It
has engaged. Such meticulous attention to detail, or synecdochic
enchantment, indicates that appropriateness conditions can not only
shift In a multlpllclty of contexts, but can equally take with them the
contexts In which they have played while they ful1llled a marginal role
within another larger structure. Thus the lnferentheme, for example,
not only has a contextual affiliation with the subgenre from which It
borrows Its principles, namely science fiction, It can also extend those
contextual principles, within Its status as an appropriateness
condition, to other subgenres, lending ltse!freadUy, and altering bodies
of knowledge to logical extremes by Its ability to repeat, In principle,
that which It has done In a previous context, In a previous larger
structure.

Bakhtln states that '[t[he word lives, as It we1e, on the
boundar:• between its own context and another, allen, context'
(1981 :284). This Bakhtlnlan principle has equal weight In our
discussion by the fact that the magic realist speech ar:t Illuminates
that which Is common to all speech acts because It Is the sum total of
Its own philosophical position In both genre theory and speech act
theory. It Is what Austin ( 1962) am: Searle (1970) classed as the
'parasite', not only because of its status as fictional, or non-serious
discourse, but because It Itself Indulges In parasitism. Thus the
felicity of a speech act's performance tn magic realism, In order for It
to be magic realism, Is not just simply a centripetal process. If we
consider, as an example from 'Peeling·, Nile's declaration that she Is
'soaked ... to the marrow of my bones' with 'antiseptic', and that 'It has
come to upset me' (1974:29), we can see that the lllocutlon of her act
Is grounded In a parasitic performance and not tn some centripetal
process towards an Idealized performatlve. Indeed. the Implication of
the word antlsepUc Is such that, In this context, the declaratory force
of the act allows the allen context to become a part cf Nile while
simultaneously projecting her being Into a multiplicity of parasitic
contexts, all with disastrous perlocutlonary consequences for the
narrator's Intentions, and thus eradicating the notion of her ab!Uty to
speak and exist In performative essences.
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And, If we further consider this status quo wh uln the context of
the narrator of 'Peeling', we find a rather surprisingly stmllar set of
circumstances. Within a relatively short amount of time, the Reader
Function Is made aware of the narrator's position towards the colour
whtte. Whtle 'white hair' Is his 'one dlstlnctton' (1974:22), the narrator
states that 'I loathe white' (1974:23). Indeed, the colour white Is
Initially given a rudimentary place In the performatlve essences of the
narrator's existence, alongside all the other essentlallistlc
performatives he knows about himself. But, because he desires to be
gratified by an equally Idealized and essentialltstic performative which
classifies Nile, the one distinction that marks him Is thrown Into a
multiplicity of parasitic performant•.,s. Because It Is not centripetal,
the colour white plays from cont< <t to context, from Nile's white
bedroom to her white bedspread, from her white dolls to her white
throat, and from 'her fears about the souls of aborted babies'
(1974:28) to the narrator's feeling that he 'may drown In a mlllton
gallons of milk' (1974:31).
While the colour white 1tself 'has no appeal to [Nile[, It Is simply
that It says nothing, being less dramatic than black', It foregrounds
the narrator's continually frustrated efforts. throughout the narrative
performances, to get at her 'true colour', or to find something that
equates to his preference for '[s]omethtng a little more feminine.
Something wlth ... more character about It' (1974:23). For the narrator,
this something Is a 'pretty blue' (1974:23) and could be the difference
in her character to the colour white, which he believes Is one of his
disttngutshtng, centripetal features. or one of his essences. However,
Nile's predominant colour Is one that falls Into the multiplicity of
contexts, not only making her speech performances and her existence
a parasitic product, but also confronting the narrator with the everexisting threat that his own esscnttaltsms are nothing more than an
Illusion tn the parasitism of the colour white.
As we can see, an lllocuttonary performance does not
deductively appropriate to Itself that which Is Its essence In some
Idealized state, as Searle ( 1970:55; !979:204-5) wanted to do when he
spoke of excluding marginal cases. and Austin tried to do during the
course of How To Do Thtngs With Words but could not because the
purity of performatlves 'gave trouble from the start .... (and( has to be
abandoned In favour of more general jamUies of related and
overlapping speech-acts' (1962: 150).
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It Is by this notion of 'general famtlles' of acts In which Derrlda

states that the system 'I call graphematic In general...consequently
biurs ... all the oppositions which follow, oppositions whose pertinence,
purity, and rigor Austin [and, later, Searle] has unsuccessfully
attempted to establish' (Sec,l979:187). The felicity of the magtc realist
speech act lies In Its margine.. In Its 'Infelicities', In tts ability to
eradicate distinctions and Incorporate the appropriateness conditions
which belong to the extended families of subgenres and speech acts
Into Its own 'context', while overtly pointing out that they equally play
In the contexts of the other. The key ts to isolate the thematic role
played by the base principle In allowing the Author Function to
harness the 111ocutlonary forces of subgenertc Indicators that are
found In the appropriateness conditions. This culmination of
harnessed forces can thus result !n a type of subgenertc closure. Let
us consider 'Peeling';
And she walks above my head. probab1Y arrangtng the little white
dolls which she will not explaln and which I never ask about,
knowtng she will not explain, and not lOr the moment wishing an
expanatlon. She buys the dolls from the Portobello Rood. the north
end, on Friday mo~ and at another market on Thursdays, she
has not rew.al<d where, but leaves early. at about 5 AM. I know It Is a
market she gpes to, hut I don't which one. 1he dolls an.<ve In all
conditions, cranuned Into a large carrlboard sull£ase which she takes
out on her expeditions. Those wh!ch still have hair she plucks I:Eid,
and those with eyes lose them, and those with teeth have them
rem<>.OO and she paln1s them. slowly, white. She uses a Jlat plastic
JE!nt I have seen the tinS (1974:22).
True to the base principle of 1nagtc realism, much meticulous
detail Is gtven tn the opening paragraphs of the short story. Indeed, as
I have discussed in chapter one, synecdochic enchantment tends to
allow for a rich focus on detaJiln order for that magic to occur and be
explotted by the su bgenerlc Indicators functioning Within the larger
structure of the subgenre. Although It Is possible to delve Into an
analysts of such meticulous detail and produce a specific type of
reading. 11 Will sufllce here to slate, as I already have, that the base
principle exercises an organizing force which styllstically orchestrates
the lltenuy environment to the lntentionallty of the Author Function.
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For our purposes, we wtll focus In this chapter on the synecdochic
enchantment of the dolls because It Is that which the approprtateness
conditions, as subgenerlc indicators, adhere to the most, and thereby
generate a specifically tight relationship between the dolls and Nile.
And It Is this relationship which Is taken to a logical extreme tn
the sexual encounter between Nile and the narrator. Thus the
!nferentheme and the ground rule reversal have particularly strong
Influences here by their ability to adhere to the meticulous deta!l
given In the above extract, especially that which communicates the
state of the dolls. It will help, therefore, to remember their whiteness,
thetr baldness, and thetr featureless state of existence as an organized
product, through Author Function Intentionality and base principle,
which has a direct consequence In the sjuzhet of the narrative.
This leads us to the notion of the fantastic In magic realism. As
I have stated In chapter one, the fantastic Is also a sufficient
condition because, as appropriateness condition, It can lend Itself
readily to other subgenres, and can thereby modi!'y Its Ulocutlonary
force as su bgenertc indicator in conjunction wtth the requirements of
the base principle In question. Within the context of magic realism,
the fantastic Indicator, like any other subgenerlc Indicator, merges
with the meticulous detail In the narrative so that Its perlocutlonary
effect may occur. This is the logical outcome of the harnessing of the
fantastic as an appropriateness condition by the base principle of
synecdochic enchantment. But what, then, characterizes the
fantastic?
Rabkin states that 'the fantastic has a place In any narrative
(sub(genre, but that (sub]genre to which the fantastic Is exhaustively
central Is the class of narrative.s we call Fantasy' ( 1976:29). Despite
our refutation of centrality, R?.'okin Is quite rtght In pointing out that
the fantastic, as appropriateness condition and subgeneric Indicator,
is axiomatically dependent upon the base principle of that subgenre
we call Fantasy. Indeed, we have mentioned before In our argument, In
chapter one, when we spoke of a similar set of circumstances with the
axiomatic dependency of fabulation to the subgeneric Fable. And we
have men tloned In this chapter repeatedly that ali appropriateness
conditions lend themselves readily to other contexts, other subgenres,
and can thereby constitute themselves differently In accord,mce wtth
the base principles of those larger structures.
Since the fantastic adheres, In magic realism, to the meticulous
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detail laid out by the base principle of synecdochic enchantment, It
forces a ground rule reversal of the subgenre's necessary condition to
occur. Rabkin argues that 'In most narratives, no matter where they
fall along the scale of the fantastic, the ground rules of the narrative
world accommodate paired opposites. In a Fantasy, the opposition Is
at the level of the ground rules themselves. In this, Fantasy Is unique'
(1976:38).
With magic realism, a ground rule reversal Is both thematic,
worklog tn conjunction with the tnferentheme, and on the level of the
structure Itself. Rabkin's 'paired opposites' Indicate that a reversal is
somewhat similar to the hierarchal aggression that occurs In a binary
opposition. And stnce appropriateness conditions cannot be enclosed
by a single context, functioning rather In a multiplicity of contexts, It
Is always possible that a paradigm shift from su bgenre to subgenre,
context to context, takes with It the probabillty of reversal found In
the trace of the other. Thus we return to the axiomatic dependency of
the fantastic on Fantasy. In Fantasy, according to Rabkin, the ground
rule reversal Is at the level of the ground rules Itself. In our words, the
base principle of Fantasy is a continual 360 degree reversal of the
ground rules at particular chronotopic points in the narrative. In
layman's terms, Fantasy continually reverses tts own narratorial
propositions, and Rabkin ( 1976) himself validates this with the
example of Through the Looking Glass, where the ground rules of the
literary environment and the extra-literary environment are
continually reversed, or contradicted, as the seemingly impossible
becomes possible.
For us however. it is fair only to state that the fantastic, as
appropriateness condition, has an axtomatic dependency on this base
principle of Fantasy. Unlike Fantasy, magic realism does not make !he
Impossible possible, It makes the possible extremely possible because
that which Is known, or that which Is made clear by the base principle
and the ground rules of the narrative, Is taken to Its logical extreme
by the tnferentheme. Thus for our purposes, the fantastic (Rabkin,
1976: 12) Is characterized by a 180 degree reversal of the ground rules In
accordance with the necessary demand of the base principle. In this
sense, then, we have what Derrida would term as a 'non-present
remainder [orJ a differential mark cut off from Its putative 'production'
or origin' (Limited Inc. , 1979: 190). It Is exactly like the Derrtdean 'trace'
and Is 'neither present nor absent' (/..lmlted Inc., 1979: 190). What this
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means Is that an axiomatic dependency Is based on both the
presupposed o!igln of a context for an appropliateness condition and
the absence of such an origin because It falls Into the multiplicity of
contexts, whereby the o!igln Itself Is perhaps also the product of such
multiplicity.
Thus Fantasy as a subgenre can Itself be characterized as a
product of contextual multiplicity on the graphematlc level, and Its
base plinolple Is a necessary condition of our ablllty to explore It as a
product of stylistic difference In the larger structure. Consider the
folloWing description of Nile by the narrator;
She Ls, how to can It, artlstlc. She wears clothes of an onllnaly person,
ofa great number of quite dlfierent onllnaly P'fSOllS, but she ammges
them In the manner of those who are caRed artLstlc. Small pieceS are
tacked together With a confidence that contradicts her manner and
amazes me. Pieces of tiny artlllc:lalll<mers, a pm of a butchet's apron,
okl Portugese shoes, a sliver pendan~ medal rtbbons, a hand-(Elnted
stole, and a hundred milk botlle tops made unreoognlzable. She Ls like
a magpie With a movable nest (1974:25-26).
Of all the performances that constitute Nile as a speaker In a
magic reaUst context, she is tc some degree a product of subgeneric
Fantasy because of the lllocutlonary force of the fantastic Indicator.
Indeed, the figure described In the above passage seems to be both an
image of singular, objecified artfulness as well as that which can
readily slip out of her own artfully unified, larger structure Into the
multiplicity that characterizes her by way of a ground rule reversal.
Hypothetically speaking, lf this figure of Nile appeared In a subgenerlc
Fantasy, and not, as It does, In magtc realism, then the multiplicity,
In the above, that contributes to a ground rule reversal would help to
contribute not just once, but several times during the narrative. That
Is to say, the base principle of Fantasy allows the narrative to Indulge
In Its thematic multiplicity and so continually exploit the posstblllty
of a ground rule reversal whenever the subgenerlc context allows for a
graphematlc shift. Thus the narrative of 'Peeling', as subgenertc
Fantasy, need not finish With Nile's metamorphic ground rule reversal
Into a doll that Is shattered and lifeless, but could exploit this
metamorphosis further by gtvtng Nile life In a different context,
thereby continuing to make the Impossible possible through the
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organizing factor of Fantasy's base principle.
However, since Nile Is not a speaker of subgenerlc Fantasy, she
cannot :partake in more than one ground rule reversal because the
magic realist base principle deliberately lm'Okes a reversal of a
thematic and detailed set of related, binary oppositions. That Is to
say, the progressive !ogle of the lnferentheme can foreground Nile's
specific multiplicities because binary oppositions, such as Nile/ dolls
and dolls/ aborted babies, Initially pair up specific details for the sole
purpose of collapsing them into each other's contexts. Thus Nile
becomes a figure who is axiomatically dependent on subgeneric
Fantasy because Carey, as Author Function, uses the fantastic
Indicator as a technique In the magic realist performance to Instigate
that once-only collapse, or reversal. And, because Nile is firmly
grounded in this magic realist performance, her essentialism, which Is
so important to the narrator as a body of knowledge, remains in the
constant state of multiplicities that confronted the narrator in the
first place.
In the case of the fantastic as an appropriateness condition, or
subgeneric indicator, or even as a technique that can be intentionally
invoked by the Author Function, the axiomatic dependency indicates
that such a harnessing cannot but Invoke a contextual multiplicity,
and cannot but invoke a probable reversal of the ground rules at some
point In the sjuzhet. To write this as an algortthm would be state that
X < Y [where X = appropriateness condition, subgenerlc indicator, or
technique, andY= the putative origin, or subgenertc base prtnctple).
Thus the relationship between the fantastic and Fantasy is similar to
that of fabulation and Fable. And in this sJmilartty, there Is always a
probab111ty that previous contexts filter through as a 'non-present
remainder' or 'trace' by the fact that tterablllty reigns predominant in
both the larger struo< ·.•re, or the subgenre, and the microcosmic level,
or the appropriateness condition.
Before we continue. I would like to discuss the position of those
readers who might lay claim to Tzvetan Todorov's notion of the
fantastic rather than Rabkin's. I shall state from the start that I find
Todorov's structural approach rather unsatisfactory. Todorov [ 1973:323, 44-57) argues that the fantastic Itself is a genre which has not
only, as Its central proposition, the principle of hesitation, but also
the posslblllty of several valiant subgenres within Its idealized form,
something he would call the pure fantastic. Cornwell states that 'In
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more Todorovtan terms. the fantastic may be present tn a work which
ultimately turns out to belong (with the resolution of the fantastic
Issue -or the issue or quality of the fantastic) to the uncanny or the
marvellous' (1990:31). By the same logic, the fantastic may be present
in a work that ultimately turns out to belong neither to the uncanny
or marvellous, but to magic reallsm, modernism, romanticism, or even
realism.
From our position stated above, any notion of either an
Idealized generic form with a su bgeneric varlancy seems simply
superfluous, given the nature of the appropriateness condition.
Indeed, to lay claim to the fantastic as a genre In Itself seems rather
weak, considering the fact that the term genre. in our argument,
simply means medium. rather than propositional content or styllstlcs.
Equally. such a claim for the fantastic as subgenre would just be
another synonomous term for the subgenre of Fantasy Itself. So 1t
would seem better suited, as we have already argued, to retain the
concept of subgenre to that which the fantastic is an axiomatic
dependent. namely Fantasy. so illuminating a more broader scope of
graphematic play within the appropriateness conditions and their
participation in other larger structures.
Todorov's other proposition. the principle of hesitation, seems
to me to be equally dubious. Todorov argues that 'the fantastic Is
based essentially on a hesitation of the reader ·a reader who identifies
with the chief character- as to the nature of an uncanny event'
(1973:157). He then states that such a hesitation may be
'acknowledged' either as 'reality' or as 'the fruit of imagination or the
result of an Illusion', so ultimately It Is up to the reader to decide
whether 'the event Is or Is not' fantastic (1973:157). The problem with
such a notion Is primarily the following. So many appropriateness
conditions can be characterized by a contextual hesitation for the
Reader Function that they could find themselves In something other
than a structural realm which stgnlfles the Todorovtan fantastic genre
or subgenre. One can argue that Todorov's notion is so reader
dependent that what may seem fantastic for one reader may not be
fantastic for another. The same can be said for the notion of subgenre
and structurallty. What may seem structurally like the fantastic for
one Reader Function, because of this principle of hesitation, may for
another be, for example, magic realism! All In all. I prefer to
Incorporate Rabkin's principle on the basis of Its axiomatic
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dependency, and Its ability (or lterablllty) to lend Itself readily to other
subgenres in the structural and contextual sense.
Let us consider the climax and denouement from 'Peeling':
I take her hand, Wlshlng to reasswe her. It """""""' Itself from
her body. I am talklng to her. Touchlng her. wishing that she shoukl
ans\m' me. But wl1h each touch she Is dlsrnenJbeml. sV.vly. Hmb l:!f
llmb. Untll, headless, annless, legless. I carelesslY ne tey grtp and she
Jails to the floor. There Is a sharp noise, rather llke l:xmldng glass.
Bendlng down I ~ among the fragments a small doll,
ha!Ib;s, e;ekss. and white fium head to tre (1974:32).
Leavtng aside a general kind of l!terary analysts, one that seJVes
to explain the nature of the narrative Itself. we shall concentrate, as
we have done, on the structural Implications of the subgenre and our
position to the narrative as a participant In that larger structure. We
will begin by noting that our notion of synecdochic enchantment has
allowed the Author Function to take the meticulous detail of the
white dolls throughout the narrative to such a degree that the base
principle has planted seeds, as It were, at carefully orchestrated
points. This kind of planting, In conjunction with the sjuzhet,
generally gives the Reader Function evidence of a type that seems to
Implicate them 1o a treasure hunt for clues which culminate In a type
of readlog which, In the case of Carey's stones, tends to be considered
in desperate need of moral or ethical discussions above all else.
Hassall wrttes that 'the whole of 'Peeling· Is lndetenntnate In
status, and all the more unsettling as a result' {1994:14). He also
states that '{l]t Is Impossible to detemline with any certainty on what
level the narrator's consciousness, or indeed of reality, these changes
take place: but they are disturbingly suggestive' (1994:15). I will not go
Into the problematic nature of such a proposition here, but I wlll state
that magic realism does seem to revitalize, as I have said before, the
sjuzhet, the strtngent requirements of adhering to a cause-and-effect
structure that underlies the written narrative like a framework. Thus
the earring In 'Peeling'. as an element of meticulous detail, serves to
slgntfy the cause-and-effect movement Into the climax and
denouement where the narrator, In seemingly normal sexual advances,
peels away the woman he desires. It Is a movement based on the
dialogic Importation of the ghost of the realist base prloclple.
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Mlller argues that '[t)he significant level In "realist" fiction Is
always local: local cause and effect operate wtthln cosmic chance,
unimpeded hy gods and demons' (1986:4). Indeed, by such a structural
requirement of locality, the white dolls exist perfectly within a
narrative movement that dictates their Importance at the beginning,
and somewhat concludes their Importance at the end. In this sense,
then, the base principle of realism allows for the possibility of an
explanation by a Iogic that is both local and natural, one does not
need to search beyond these requirements to determine the movement
of cause and effect.
However, the base principle of magic realism, that necessary
condition which organizes all Importations, whether they be of a
dialogic nature, such as base principles, or of a graphematlc nature,
such as appropriateness conditions, demolishes this requirement by
the fact that both the !nferentheme and the fantastic Indicator have a
predominant Influence on the way meticulous detail Is discursiVely
represented and received. Wilson states that 'In magic realism space Is
hybrid (opposite and conflicting properties are co-present)' (1986:70).
Thus the Reader Function cannot but explain this Importance by both
a cause-and-effect explanation, especially at the end, when the dolls
are rendered equal to their owner, and by the ability to transgress this
local explanation through the metaphoric status of the denouement,
giving scope for variant readings.
Let us dwell upon the notion of the sjuzhet and the nature of
the dolls. I mentioned that magic realism adheres to a stringent
cause-and·-effect structure, and 'Peeling' is no exception. It is
important to mention here that this 'presence' of cause and effect Is
based on the dialogic importation of the base principle of realism,
thereby complimenting the 'realism' in the 'magic realism'. This causeand-effect structure is. of course, predominant ln the climax where
the narrator, ln his sexual advances on Nile, sets into motion a series
of causes and effects. These causes and effects are generally associated
with their extra-literary counterparts, hence the realism, and so, on
one level, seem to appear almost normal or natural, such as the
undressing of the female in anticipation of penetration into a glorified
essence.
The narrator himself had stated earlier that 'When I finally take
her to bed (and I am in no hurry, no hurry at all) I w111 get some better
idea of her true colour, get under her skin as It were' (1974:23).
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Interestingly enough, the speech act 'Did you get the pun?' (1974:23),
following this one made by the narrator, Is grounded In the
metaftctlonal technique, and one can here speculate that what seems
like a continuing narrative of the narrator Is, In fact, quite likely to be
the refracted words of Carey himself, setting the structure up for the
events that will follow. Thus events that seem natural ultimately lead
to the dismemberment not only of the female body, but also the
solution to the mystery of her essence he so desires to uncover.
Petzold states that to participate In a qualification of '"fantasy"
(or more appropriately, the fantastic], fiction needs to express a
conscious departure from, even a rebellion against, the principle of
mimesis' (1986:15]. As we have seen In the above argument, even the
base principle of another subgenre, as ghost or trace, can be Imported
on the basis of the demands of the subgenre In question. This we can
see occurring In magic realism where the base principle of realism Is
an object on which the fantastic Indicator can act In order to
amalgamate Its force Into the context of the larger structure. The
fantastic indicator functions, therefore. as a complimentary force in
which the larger structure, namely the subgenre of magic realism,
explodes the cause and effect that stipulates X as being realist, X
being whatever narrative acts that may fit those characteristics on the
basts of the subgenerlc base principle. namely synecdochic
enchantment, as a necessary condition. Van !kin argues that '(t]he
story's logic Is that of life and human nature -a logic detetmined by
processes more profound than mere cause and effect' (1977:29). Thus
'Peeling', beginning with a woman who collects white dolls and
organizes her life around them, ends its narrative with a ground rule
reversal that stipulates her becoming a thing that is equal to the
material evidence of her life, and that Is to become a doll herself. Such
Is the nature of the subgenertc illocutlonary forces which constitute
'Peeling' as a narrative act.
What we have discussed so far with 'Peeling· and the fantastic
Indicator can benefit from a brief discussion of the lnferentheme.
Consider the following extract from the short story:
I am In no huny. There Is no wgency In the matter. Sooner or later
we shall dl9cuss the oysters. Then It will be time to nv;e on to otber
more Intimate things. Imvlng la}cr after la}cr, until! d1oc.cM!r her true
colours, her flavours, her smells. The prospect of so slow an
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e>qiofati:m =lies -

and 1am Jn no huny, no huny at an. May 1t

iast berer(l974:24).

We can begin by noting that the narrator's anticipating his
future gratification Is only partly driven by the physical experiences of
the situation Itself. Much of what amounts to the greater experience,
tn the eyes of the narrator, Is based on his desire for knowledge, and
for that knowledge to progress him logically to an even greater
understanding than before. We may remember the point we made,
earlier In the chapter, about the lnferentheme and Its ability, as an
appropriateness condition for magic realism, to borrow epistemological
principles from subgenertc science fiction.
It Is time to Illuminate this point a little further with the help
of a few critics. Daniel reads Carey's 'Peeling· as a perfect example of
the 'fear that If we peel back the layers of the Infinite onion of the
universe, there will be nothing, or only an Image, without features'
(1988: 153). Tate (1987) argues that 'Peeling' presents the female body
as both mystery and multi-layered text, where the act of peeling
becomes a celebration of the repression of the feminine and the
destruction of gender differences, demystlfylng the female body
through the knowledge that Nile is no longer a threat to the narrator's
masculinity. And Manning ( 1985:41) writes that 'Peeling· cannot but
explain Itself psychoanalytically, but in order to do so, the text must
be Inserted into an existing structure of reality, namely the body of
knowledge called psychoanalysis.
Although this comes across as a melange of quotations, the
Interesting thing to be learned from statements is the alfillatton they
make with bodies of knowledge as the way in which the text is relfied,
or explained in order to achieve a degree of comfortable
understanding. Once again, a cause-and-effect approach is strictly
adhered to, but each of the critics seems to understand that the
affiliation they make between bodies of knowledge and the text must
also include the logical progression of that knowledge towards an
extreme situation, and ultimately a fantastic scenario. The knowledge
itself represents part of that process which will eventually lead to the
lllocutionary force of the fantastic indicator and the perlocutlonm-y
effect of a ground rule reversal. I have earlier mentioned that the such
a ground rule reversal may benefit from a conjunctive Involvement
with the tnferentheme. Indeed, that is exactly what occurs in 'Peeling'
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and what we have been alluding to In these two paragraphs. For us,
and for the magic real!st subgenre, thts indicates the Influential force
of the lnferentheme.
Carey himself, In Interviews with Maddocks (1981:31-2) and
WU!banks (1991:49) states that the mystery In 'Peeling' Is the mystery
of the dolls, they are there In the beginning and In the end, without
any psychological explanation. and therefore constitute the mystery
Itself when the narrator discovers that the essence he was searching
for Is no different from that which he saw and knew of In the first
place. This search for an essence is, as we have already stated, a
search for knowledge, and by the lnferentheme's function In the larger
structure of the subgenre, this knowledge constitutes Itself as a
critical factor, for the Author Function, In the representation of
meticulous detaU that wUI lead to the ground rule reversal. Thus the
oysters, for example, which the narrator will buy because 'She has
revealed ... a love for oysters' ( 1974:23) will lead to a discussion of that
body of knowledge which defines them as aphrodisiacs, so leading to
greater sexual delicacies and discoveries. The logical progression and
manifestation of such a will to knowledge Is the sexual advancements
made In the climax of 'Peeling' by the narrator, only to be reversed by
the ground rule of the white dolls that make up a part of the body of
knowledge called Nile In the narrative act of the short story.
Although It borrows Its operative principles from subgenerlc
science fiction, the !nferentheme does not necessarily organise Itself
against a background of scientific knowledge on every occasion. It can
also operate quite happUy In such bodies of knowledge as sexuality,
theology, or any other methodologies for that matter. Indeed, In
'Peeling', the body of knowledge taken to Its extreme and logical
extension Is that which proposes not only to explore, but also to
define, the essence of 1Noman, gender differences, desire, and
gratification. What began as a mystery In 'Peeling' remains, by the
lllocuttonary force of the lnferentheme, as a mystery first, last, and
always. That Is to say, the narrator Is confronted with various
'threads' of knowledge, supplied by Nile, which he trtes to separate
Into 'loose kinds', or 'threads' of Idle chit-chat, and 'the other kind', or
the 'one that might unravel the whole sweater' (1974:26). It Is
Important for the narrator to know which one he Is confronted with
because he 'would prefer to know [the Idle) things, before [he) come[sJ
to the centre of things' (1974:27).
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The narrator, therefore, would rather discuss her 'love for
oysters' (1974:23) than 'the souls of aborted babies' (1974:28), peeling
away the layers gradually, over the years, until he gets to the
essentialism of her being. This slow act of peeling Is based on his
anticipation to gratify the desire for knowledge that will come Into his
possession, and Is metaphorically characteriZed by his meticulous
methodology 'In the art of sucking barley sugar' ( 1974:27). But,
because Nile Is an axiomatic dependent of Fantasy, both by the
Ulocutlonary force of the fantastic Indicator and, perhaps, the sexual
whims of the narrator, the !llocutlonary force of the lnferentheme that
Is parasitically present In her speech acts spUl over Into the narrator's
acts of Idle chit-chat faster than he can control.
This onslaught of knowledge entices the narrator to progress
faster than he would like with his intentions, and so the act of
peeling, or sucking barley sugar. transgresses from an extended
Intellectual tlmespace to the Immediate material reality. In this sense,
clothes are removed with great speed, knowledge is taken to its logical
extreme, and Nile's essentlallstlc beingness is literally shattered by the
remaining pieces of a broken, white doll. The inferentheme has taken
the narrator's desire for wanting to understand Woman's essentialism
to its logical extreme, returning wllly-nllly back to the multiplicities
that mark her, and foregrounding the complexity of the larger
structure called Nile. To return to the analogy of barley sugar. the
knowledge. like the sweet, has been savoured to Its logically
progressive end, and the narrator is left with the aftertaste of a
Socractic reductio ad absurdum.
Our topic in this chapter has been primarily concerned with
how the appropriateness conditions, on a microcosmic level, shift
from a multiplicity of contexts to the status of subgeneric indicators
within a larger structure, namely the context of subgeneric magic
realism. In this sense, then, we have been dealing with the notion of
felicities and infelicities of an act. While Austin (1962) is constantly
aware that the purity of a performance is an illusion because its
potential as a definitive performance can be altered by the Infelicity,
Searle ( 1970) Is quite adamant that the purity of performatlve is not
only a posslblllty, but a necessary undertaking In order to classify acts
as acts of a specific lllocutlonary type. For Searle, Infelicities signify
an unsuccessful performance rather than an alteration in
performance. His preference to classify a successful performance Is
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done purely on the basts of central felicities In an Idealized situation
of the act, or the pure performative (Searle, 1970:55). We, like Derrlda
(1979), have tried to Incorporate both the felicity and the Infelicity
Into the classification of the performatlve, preferring to focus on the
non-serious, the fictional, or an Infelicitous performance like magic
realism, on the basts that the Infelicity can be as Important as the
felicity to an analytical and philosophical approach In speech act
theory.
What has been our main concern, however, is a combined
approach of genre theory and speech act theory by the notion that
appropriateness conditions exist In a graphematlc state, In a
multiplicity of contexts, prior to their recruitment as subgenerlc
Indicators with lllocutlonary forces. What I want to distinguish here Is
the duality of microcosmic chaos and order In the larger structures
called subgenres. Daniel states that '(t]he Australian New Novel Is a
prismatic play of mind, ludic and absurdlst, a fabric of hazard,
paradox, contradiction, Instability -the instability that quantum physics
shows us Is at the core of things' (1988:21. My Italics). Although Daniel
speaks of the genre of the novel, we can transfer this notion of physics
and quantum physics to language and the genre of the short story. We
have, then, what might best be stated as the aporia of structuralism
and poststructurallsm, working together In a logical contradiction to
produce chaos and order in the larger structures called subgenres
which exist In generic media of language. Daniel also states that '(t]he
logic of cause and effect has been replaced by Heisenberg's Uncertainty
Principle. Reality is random and literature now has to contend with
the inherent certainty of matter, a randomness subject to the role of
the observer -the indeterminacy of the universe' (1988: 16).
Although we may have chaos. uncertainty, and randomness In
both the quantum level of physics and language, we do have, to a
greater or lesser degree, order in the larger structures. As we have seen
In this chapter, magic realism, as one su bgenertc example amongst
many, has this duality by the appropriateness condition within the
subgenerlc structure, Its Indicators and their forces. Physicist Paul
Davies states that '[a)lthough there Is generally no certainty about the
future states of a quantum system, the relative probabilltles of the
different possible states are still determlned .... on a macroscopic scale
where quanturn effects are usually not noticeable, nature seems to
conform to deterministic laws' (1992:31). Here we have a difference
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between physics and language because, on a macroscopic scale, the
quantum effect Is noticeable In language If one understands the
principle of Uncertainty, or, as It Is most commonly known, the
concept of d!fferance. Nevertheless, our larger linguistic structures can
and do display a tendency toward signifying order, even If that order
Is, from time to time, disrupted by an Infelicity. And when such a
disruption occurs, when such a shtft from context to context is
brought Into being, can we not say that such a shift Is not the great
leap Into chaos but simply an ordered change of contexts?
Voloshlnov states;
Anyutlemm!, no matter how ~Wand COlllpkte 1n and of ltsen; Is

my a rmmentln theantr~.DJspruooss <fveroaJ.ctmUJlbDtn But that
contlnuons \eltel communlcatlOn Is. In twn, Itself only a moment In
the continuous, all-lnchtslve, generative process of a given social
collectlve... .VerOOI corrununlca1ion can never be understood and

e>q:tllned a11Side <!this COJ1r>'lifoo with a roncrete sltua/IOTL ~
aap.dres l!{e and hlstDrtrolly ~ues prectsely here. In concrete vertJal
COT111l1lJ11W10 and not In the abstmd llngllistlc system qf lnnguDge
jorms,rllTtnthe lndJv(dualpsycheqfspealrers (1973:95).

Thus, while the graphematlc stature of the appropriateness
condition has the ablllty to Invoke a multiplicity of contexts on the
quantum level of language, the order of the larger structure
incorporates such a shift into the verbal processes of its own narrative
acts. The appropriateness condition Is. like the grapheme, the major
contender of play In the system. but the system Itself exists within a
state of order that comprises the context of the speech act. the mode
of communication, and the transference of meaning in a concrete,
social, context, or situation. In classing an act, the notion of
Infelicities and felicities should, therefore, be determined by a
multiplicity of contexts, a multiplicity of potential speaking sltuatlons
applicable to that act, and not, as Searle stipulated, by the felicitous
conditions of some idealized act In some idealized singular context.
One might say that the base principle of a subgenre Is Its true
felicity, organizing the appropriateness conditions almost centripetally
so that they may function as subgenerlc Indicators. But even wlthln
this proposition, one must be careful of the dialogic Importation of
other base principles. For If one finds a base principle, one must
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continue to search, by way of fellci<ies and lnfel!cltles, to see If there
are any more, and to see, if there are, which ones have been
dialogically Imported to compliment the lllocutlonary forces of
subgenelic Indicators within the larger structure. And since we have
discussed this in our current chapter, what lies ahead is a discussion
of the total type of Ulocutlon, or the sum total of those forces, so to
speak, and their relationship between Author Function, Reader
Function, and the state of closure for the production and transference
of meaning. Grounding ourselves In the structural analysis of
chapters one and two. our next chapter will be a reading of the magic
realist speech act. Our shift from the quantum level to the larger
structure has, more or less, occurred.
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Three: Closure Denominators: 'American Dreams'.
In the previous chapter, we made the distinction between the
stgntfytng events at the quantum level of language and the subgenre of
magic realism, as a larger structure, in order to accommodate and
entertain, within a general scope, the apparentness of a semantic
order and a semant:~ chaos. Indeed, we argued that every ordered
context has the probal:•lity of being able to slip Into a multiplicity of
contexts because our subgeneric Indicator, wtth Its Ulocutlonary force,
Is equally an appropriateness condition In a system of multiple forces.
And tn this multiplicity of forces, we have understood that the
appropriateness condition, like the grapheme, 'can be Imitated,
and ... tmttates Itself (Derrtda, Limited, Inc., 1979: 167) tn a
performance of multiple contexts, erasing all strict semantic essences,
and thereby opening up the text to nurnerous meanings in numerous
contexts. Furthermore, this principle is based on the Intimate
relationship between the grapheme and the locu tton as 'tterable
marks' (Derrtda, Sec .. l979: 187), and on the Derrtdean concept of
dlfferance.
To sidetrack briefly, I made the connection between dlfferance
and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle tn chapter two by stating that
In language. this principle of Uncertainty, or dlfferance, is noticeable
in the macroscopic scale, or the larger structure. In the application of
the Uncertainty Principle In quantum physics, Paul Davies argues that
'at the subatomic level, where quantum physics is important, a
collection of particles must be treated holistically. The behavior of one
particle is inextricably entangled with those of the others. however
great the Interparticle separations may be' (1992: 158). This Is Indeed a
proposition which Derrida, in 'Signature, event, context', would
advocate as a necessity prior to any establishment of locuttonary
closure. an.d which we have, to the best of our abiH.ty, adhered to in
chapters one and two. One must hoHsttcally examine the contexts. or
the possibility of contexts, available to the appropriateness condition,
especially when It Is lnstltuted as a subgeneric indicator with
lllocutlonary force In a larger structure.
In this sense, I would like to extend the holistic proposition
further because tt ts crucial to the notion of closure we are about to
discuss. Barthes' famous conclusion, 'the b!rtl: of the reader must be
at the cost of the death of the Author' (1977:148), has particular
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importance here. In the same essay, Barthes also stated that 'a text's
unity lies not In Its origin but In Its destination' (1977:148). Neither of
these two quotations allows readers to participate In the holistic
exercise which I deem essential to closure and meaning. For Barthes,
the text means something at Its destination when It Is In the hands of
the reader, not In a process of semantic regressslon back to the origin
of Its production, the author. The problem with such a proposition Is
one that will constantly resurface In this chapter simply because It Is
Intimately tied up with the enigma that Is the larger structure known
as the subgenre. But one major flaw which Barthes does not account
for Is one that Is hidden within the proposition of his speech act. That
Is to say, If the text's unity lies In Its destination and not Its origin.
can we not say that the author, as a Function of literary production,
Is aware of this factor and thereby consolidates his Authority with the
understanding that his text will produce a mixed bag of meaning at Its
point of destination? From a Foucauldian perspective, Lamb points
out, '[a[s our readings -of Carey's fiction. newspaper and magazine
Interviews with him. reVIews of his work. and profiles of his life Intersect, we are caught up In a different kind of fabrication, or
production, In which Carey Is forced to play a part, though It Is often
difficult to gauge how active, or willing, a part' (1992:2).
Nevertheless, Is It nol true enough to say that this mixed bag of
meaning, or interpretations, will have some common elements which
account for a unity within that text al lls point of destination, the
social context, or the reader as a literary Function in the production
of meaning? Voloshinov states that the 'word is oriented towards an
addressee· ( 1973:85), and that 'the printed verbal perfonnance engages
.. .In ideological colloquy on a large scale: It responds to somelhlng.
objects to something, affirms something, anticipates pvsslble
responses and objections. seeks support, and so on' (1973:95). If this
Is so, and to my mind it Is, then the so-called death of the author
surrenders all that which had been associated with the author to the
reader, a surrender which ruthlessly destroys any conscious attempt
to enter Into the dynamics of the dialogue between author and reader
as literary Functions In the production and transference of meaning.
Indeed, a Barthean approach Is based on a closed and artificial
dialogue between the Reader Function and the IWJgue, projecting
consciousness on to a non-conscious system.
Carey states that 'I know that I had all the different Ideas and
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arguments and threads of things and kept It all In my head,
everything, as I was wrlttng .... but when the writing Is over, vel}' soon
afterwards, or as soon as I begin to think about another book, all that
goes away' (WU!banks, 1991 :50). The point we can make here Is that
Carey writes with a destination, or semantic direction In mind. He
writes With an Intentionality suited to his holding both a position of
Author Function and Reader Function. However, I do not want to
advocate a type of analysis, for the Reader Function, that attempts to
get at the total Intentionality, the arguments, different ideas, and
threads of things, which occupy the mind of the Author Function.
Such an undertaking Will undoubtedly take the Reader Function to
the land of Intentional fallacies. When It comes to the production of
meaning, its transference, and the corresponding notion of an
Intentionality that directs textual semantics In the larger structure,
we need to examine all that which Is produced by the Author
Function, and about the Author Function, as we search for the
common denominators of a strong closure. Indeed, this Is not so
much an argument based on the existence of meaning as it is an
examination of the ex!stence of Authority, and the problem of who
has Authority In their possession.
As Petrey states, 'It [o see the text as act, which an Aust!u!an
approach requires, does not at all force us to construe it as an act
with one and only one sense. Like the lllocutlonary force of a given
locution, the meaning of a given text derives from the protocols applied to
it' (1990:82. My ltal!cs). Fish argues, '[t[hc structure of meantng ... ts
obvious and inescapable from the perspective of whatever
Interpretative assumptions [that] happen to be In force' (1980:vi!!).
Earl!er In his argument, Petrey contended that 'forces [make) l!terary
words do thtogs for readers [and) must be part of the reading, not lhe
writing, experience' (1990:81). Like most theorists In the !alter part of
the twentieth centul)', Petrey's and Fish's positions arc clearly marked
by the poststructural preoccupation with opentog meaning up to the
widest possible social context in order not to exclude the margins of
meaning in the closure of a reading. Indeed, this is not so different an
approach, as Petrey has indicated, taken up by Austin (1962) when he
made the ll!ocul!on in a social context the focal point of
understanding meaning. This is, In our case, equivalent to the
position occupied by the Reader Function. In the process of an
analysis, this poststructural position can reap rich rewards from the
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text by Its Inclusion of the reader as a Function In the production of
meaning, but since It Is not a process that occurs In Isolation from a
social context, It cannot be a process that excludes the Author
Function from that social context as a producer of a text In the public
sphere.
On the other hand. Searle argues that '[l]n speaking I attempt
to communicate certain things to my hearer by getting him to
recognize my Intention to communicate just those thtngs .... He
understands what I am saying as soon as he recognizes my Intention
In uttering what I utter as an Intention to say that thing' (1970:43,
my Italics). For Searle (1970:25: 1983:9), meaning Is the strict
performance of an lllocutlonary act with propositional content,
whereby the corresponding Intentional state is expressed with the
uttering of the propositional content so that the Intentional state,
Itself, Is a sincerity condttton of the speech act. This set of conditions
cannot be separated from '[the[ knowledge of how to speak the
language [that[ involves mastery of a system of rules which renders my
use of the elements of that language regular and systematic' ( 1970: 13).
And this, therefore, cannot be separated from a clear transference of
the addresser's meaning to the addressee because they bot·.l
understand and share the regular ana systematic mastery of language
as a system of rules.
The problem with Searle Is that he participates In that wellknown fallacy of Intentionality as it Is understood in the sphere of
literature. As I have stated earlier, this Is not the type of
Intentionality I wish to advocate as the necessary byproduct of
Incorporating the Author Function Into an analysis. When we speak
of Intentionality, Authority, and Author Function later In this
chapter, we are speaking of the Intentions that are equally applicable
to the Reader Function but do not, in either case, speak of pure
Intentional states of mind of the human beings who fill those
Functions In the dynamics of the dialogue. McDonough (1993) states
that the production and transference of meaning should not be
reduced either to a causal or mechanistic account of behaviouralism
because what the speaker may say, what the speaker may mean,
cannot be traced to the speaker's Internal thought processes, but
must be determined by what the utterance means In relation to Its
delivery In an envlronmen t.
In both Austin and Searle, the problem of Authority and the
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production and transference of meaning Is clearly outlined by the well
known literary positions of Author Function and Reader Function.
Without going Into too much detail, we can safely say that many
theorists and critics Identify strongly with either one of the two basic
positions. Indeed, Fish, taking a poststructural stance, sums the
problem up quite well when he asks, 'Ills the reader or the text the
source of meaning?' (1980:1). However, the problem with Fish, and
others like him, Is that the Author Function, as a possible Intentional
force behind a percentage of the production of meaning and Its
transference, Is safely eradicated for the notion of the text as the
source of Authority. This, In turn, makes It easier to deny the text the
status of Authority because It Is a signifying chain In the
poststructural sense rather than a product of the user of a chain In
the Searlean scheme of things, and also because Its appropriateness
conditions ultimately deny the text a singular context where Its
privilege of Authority over meaning can occur. The production of
meaning Is thereby relegated to the status of the reader, who is said to
write the text at the moment of reading.
Fish's notion Is not entirely successful to my mind, simply
because one can, as 1 have suggested in this chapter, debunk the
reader wlth what one initially debunked the author, especially when
the reader equally occupies the status of author. Furthermore, this
scenario does not explain the possiblllty of both the reader's ablllty to
read something and the reader's desire to want to read something In
order to understand the signifying direction and message of the
narrative. If no 'social' dialogue Is entered Into between an addresser
and an addressee, reganjless of the tlmespace gap between message
sent and message received, then the only meaning produced is that
which needed no indicators, or textual direction, In order for the
transference to occur in the first place. As Bakhtin states, 'one may
speak of another's discourse only with the help of that allen discourse
!tself, although in the process. 11 Is true, the speaker introduces into
the other's words his own intentions and highlights the context of
those words in his own way' (1981:355).
If the addre•ser and addressee were one and the same person,
then the message Is derived wholly from a su bjectivlty that hears not
the voice of the other In the social context of the word, even If the
word were written, but hears the word as he or she wishes the word to
be heard, producing the word as he or she wants It to be produced.
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This may seem extreme, but why should a reader read an allen
narrative when that reader has the Authorlt".f to the total proceedings
within the context of its functioning as a larger structure? Petrey
states that 'Searle makes authorial purpose the sole determining
factor In !dentil'y!ng fiction: only pretending counts, and the author
alone can make himself or herself pretend' (1990:67). Indeed, at its
best, and borrowing Petrey's summation, Fish's argument seems to
Indicate a total reversal of the Searlean type of Intentionality, gtvtng
exclusive space, time, and rights to the Reader Function rather than
an Author Function.
The problem of Authority Is, to my mlnd, a problem that cannot
be resolved, or even considered, as either Austin. Barthes, or Fish do,
by the exclusion of the Author Function when examining the nature
of any subgenertc speech act. Neither can we exclude, as Searle does,
the Reader Function from Authority without placing dlalogtsm In
severe jeopardy. Both Austin and Searle equally entertain valld points
within the context of their arguments, but each philosopher excludes
the position that their counterpart deems central to the notion of
Ulocution and Intention. As Petrey states, '[w]hen Searle allows a
single person's will to Invalidate a community's speech-act rules, he
makes Ulocution radically different from what It Is In Austin'
(1990:68). This problem of Authority, of deciding whether Author
Function or Reader Function can be the detennining source of the
producUon of meaning, is one that is mirrored in Carey's finest short
story, 'American Dreams';

But one of us did something. We slighted htm terribly In
some way, this small meek man with the rimless glasses
and neat suit who used to stnile so nicely at us all. We
thought, I suppose, he was a bit of a fool and sometimes
he was so quiet and grey that we Ignored him, forgetting
he was there at all (1974:101).
What bas happened Is that we all. all eight hundred of
us, have come to remember small transgressions against
Mr. Gleason who once lived amongst us (1974:101).
We can begin by asking ourselves the following question: within
the nature of either Author Function or Reader Function, where does
the Intention, or Authority, In the production of meaning lie, and If

57

il

we can find it, does it amou.nt to closure and transference? We would
have to state, as self-evidence, that any ability to pinpoint
Intentionality and Authority does, In the sense of 1llocutlonary forces,
amount to an act of closure occurring within the larger structure.
However, In all analysis, I do not give preference to an 'either I or'
distinction, preferring Instead to remain as much as possible within
the multiple forces of an aporia. The proposition of either an Author
Function or a Reader Function, acting as exclusive agents of
Authority Is, to my mind, a fallacy simply because closure Is an act
that requires participation In the dynamics of the dialogue between
the two positions. The subgenre of magic realism typifies this
dlaloglsm by Its harnessing of appropriateness conditions from other
contexts, and thereby demonstrates that the voice of another, which
an appropriateness condition can carry within Its graphematlc
performance, Is a logtcal necessity to the direction of lllocutlonary
forces, lntentlonalltles, and Authority In the narrative.
In the ':.:xtracts from 'American Dreams', the voice that is carried
through tt,e appropriateness conditions of the microtown ls Gleason's.
And w~ assume. through the narrator's belief In a Searlean scheme,
that t.he voice, as the ghost of Intention, comes from the site of origin
and the will of t:he producer through an intentional act of revenge for
having been slighted over the years by the American dreaming
townsfolk. But the narrator equally states, 'My father, who has never
borne malice against a single liVIng creature, still believes that
Gleason meant to do us well, that he loved the town more than any of
us. My father says we have treated the town badly In our minds'
[1974:101. My Italics). By treating the town badly in their minds, an
opposite reading to the narrator's Searlean scheme demonstrates that
the site of origin may not be just Gleason, indicating Instead that the
intentionality of mlcrotown·s Authority in meaning, Its production
and transference, lies equally with the narrator and the townsfolk
themselves.
In either case, there appears to be a dialogue emerging between
the recipient of a coded message, or Reader Function, and Its assumed
producer. or Author Function. A message that further benefits from
the subgenerlc lllocutlonary force of the fabulist technique in the
sense that the problem of Authority is a question that cannot simply
be reduced to an 'either I or' legislation, but needs to benefit from an
approach that parallels the kind of Investigation undertaken In
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situation ethics. As the narrator's father states, 'Gleason had built
the model of our town just for this moment, to let us see the beauty of
our own town, to make us proud of ourselves and to stop the
American Dreams we were prone to. For the rest ... was not Gleason's
plan and he could not have foreseen the things that happened
afterwards' (1974:108). This view, according to the narrator, Is both
'sentimental' and 'Insulting to Gleason' (1974:108). The narrator
states that 'I personally believe that he (Gleason] knew everything that
would happen' (1974: 108). and on the subject of future proof to affirm
the narrator's belief, he states that 'Certainly there are In existence
some personal papers, and I firmly believe that these papers will show
that Gleason knew exaclly what would happen' (1974: 108).
In the argument of the narrator, the notion of Intentionality Is,
as I have said earlier, typically Searlean and deeply connected with the
will to knowing, at all times, one's act and Its closure In future
contexts. What the narrator proclaims to know about the reason for
the mlcrotown's existence Is only one half of the Authority In which
he Is an equal partner. and by excluding his own contribution, as
literary Function, to the production and transference of meaning, he
excludes one half of the performance. The problem with the narrator's
view Is that to know the act and Its closure at all times, the
intentionality and Authority one claims Is simply one's own, and the
repercussions associated with claiming such forthright knowledge is
its exclusion of the social context. tts exclusion of one's fellow
speakers, and its exclusion of the conversation that brings life to the
nature of the subject. the micro town, in relation to the macro town.
It Is an exclusion which Searle (1992) would later acknowledge
as the factor which brings his theory of speech -acts to a deadening
halt because the singularity of speech-acts and their constitutive rules
do not conform to the sequence of speech-acts in a social context that
we call conversaUon. This does not entirely exclude, as wt have seen,
Searle's initial int13nUons from the speech act scene, but it does
amend that rather exclusive notion of an 'either I or' site of originality
In Intentionality and Authority. As Austin had stated within the
context of his written word, the uttered act Is not 'the outward and
VIsible sign ... of an Inward and sptrltual act: from which It is but a
short step to go on to believe or to assume without realizing that for
many purposes the outward utterance Is a descrtption, true or false, of
the occurrence of the Inward performance' (1962:9).
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Since the narrator does not see microtown as a speech-act
performance but as a constatlve example of the Inner will of an
Individual, namely Gleason, the nature of his predicament Is
characterized by an 'either I or' fallacy. It Is either true of false that
Gleason could not have foreseen the future events of his act. Since
the narrator does not see that his entrapment within the cycle of
tourism Is grounded not In the will of Gleason but In his own, his
conclusion Is based on the exclusion of the social performatlve, of the
diversity that marks his participation In the dynamics of the dialogue
and an Authority that Is both singular and his own. In this Searlean
context, the narrator himself remains an act of singularity. a
performance dictated by the constitutive rules of mlcrotown where
'They [the Americans) come In search of me and my petrol pump as
they have done for four years now. I do not await them eagerly because
I know, before they reach me. that they w!ll he disappointed'
[ 1974: 112-3). For the narrator, the performance that occurs daily In
macrotown Is marked by the constitutive rules of the mlcrotown, and
not by the conventions of the social performance that make up the
equal partnership of Authority between Author Function and Reader
Function, between Gleason and the townsfolk.
Austin, however, argued that 'the act Is constituted not by
Intention or by fact, essentially. but by convention (which Is. of course.
a fact)' (1962:128. My Italics). Thus where Authority In meaning Is
considered to lie exclusively with the townsfolk themselves, with
conventions, the dialogue Is one that is generated in the social
context of a multiplicity of speakers, each tied In some way to the
other by the commonality of having offended Gleason and bearing
guilt for the offence. The problem with such a reading of the situation
Is that 'fact' is considered to be wholly determinable by a democratic
agree1nent, and that the conventions which followed are based on the
exclusion of the Intentions of the Author Function. however small
they might be. Gleason may never have been offended personally, but
he may have been saddened by the pu bile trials and tribulations that
the town suffered in the minds and words of the townsfolk, thus
manufacturing a model to Illuminate the plurality of small scale
beauty tn the town by creating a dialogue between the two.
We must disagree with Austin that the act Is not constituted by
intention because to do so would be to exclude a percentage of the
!llocutionary force that drives the act In a direction towards closure.
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Within the context of the townsfolk and the social conventions of
what they consider to be fact, the tourism that Imprisons their lives
may very well be the product of their Intentions and their Authority In
transferring meaning from the closure of mlcrotown to the social
context of macrotown. To reiterate the statement made by the
narrator's father, Gleason's Intentionality and Authority may just
have been 'to let us see the beauty of our own town, to make us
proud of ourselves .... (and that Gleason! could not have foreseen the
things that happened afterwards' (1974:108).
So, like the Austlnlan and Searlean opposition between society
and lndlvlduality, both the positions of Author Function and Reader
Function, within the context of the lllocutlonary force and the closure
of the subgenerlc speech act, determines the production and
transference of a meaning. And because they are both equally valid,
and because they are both more complimentary In the dynamics of a
dialogue, It Is much more appropriate to look for the common
denominators, or closure denominators, such as the fabulist
technique Indicating a need for situation ethics In the above, that
creep Into the discourses of both Author Functl<'n and Reader
Function as discursive positions. Just as appropriateness conditions
can incorporate more than one context in the illocutlon of a subgenertc
indicator, so too can appropriateness condltlons incorporate both the
Author Function and the Reader Function in the contextual closure q{ an
illocutton. In an Interesting narrative strategy undertaken by RyanFazllleau (1991), Carey. although divorced from the interpretative
possibilities of his work in the public domain, is said to prolong his
Authority of his short stories by his participation In confilctlng
symbols, or leads, and, being elusive to pin down critically, Is thereby
constantly overturning the Authority of the Reader Function over his
texts.

What I find Interesting about this reading Is the notion that
closure denominators are part of the tripartite structure In which both
the appropriateness condition and the subgeneric Indicator are Its
composites, that the leads, or subgenerlc Indicator, as a closure
denominator by lllocutlonary force. can lead equally Into the
multiplicity that is foregrounded by the magic realist subgenre. But
even so, the ab111ty to shift contexts, if and when It does occur In a
polemic exercise such as deconstruction, ultimately results In the play
of an Authority that exists In another, affiliated, larger structure,
61

especially when closure Is the deciding factor of the narrative. RyanFazllleau's reading, therefore. best demonstrates the nature of the
appropriateness condition to the illocutlon In the larger structure of
the subgenre and In the dynamics of the dialogue between Author
Function and Reader Function.
In that sense, the exclusive origin of Intentionality that
produces meaning within the !llocutlonary forces of 'American
Dreams' is never resolved. Nor does it need to be. Leaving aside, for
the moment, the narrative ortgln of Carey as Author Function and our
receptive role as Reader Function, the question of Intentionality and
Its origin Is left clearly In dualistic play. Is It Gleason, In some act of
revenge because 'we have treated the town badly In our
m!nds'(l974:101), or Is It the narrator and the citizens of the town
who themselves have created the predicament of their dreams?
Perhaps It Is both.
In any case, the analysis can bear much fruit to the extensive
play of meaning between the literary and extra-literary enVIronments.
The appropriateness conditions allow for a rich multiplicity of
contexts to occur in a dynamic dialogue between Author Function and
Reader Function, some of which will be closed, even If tentatively, by
common denominators, and others which will remain speculative, but
equally useful. by their ability to rel.terate a further multiplicity of
contexts. Nevertheless, what is clear Is the simultaneous demand on
both Author Function and Reader Function In a dialogue that shapes
the dynamics of the production and transference of meaning.
Intentionality and illocutton arc subject to the common denominators
communicated by the narrative, inespectivc of theoretical discipline.
Variance from a common theme. or an inferentheme, is the stuff of
which disciplines are made, and for which narratives cater.
This example of microtown and macrotown leaves us with a
paradox that needs to be addressed. Indeed, the base principle of the
magic realist subgenre, synecdochic enchantment, within the context
of 'American Dreams', allows us, tn conjunction with the
lnferentheme and the fantastic Indicator, to discuss the mlcrotown/
macrotown construct as an analogy for the aporia between a system
that keeps on playing and the acts of closure that occur as a result of
that play. Like Petrey's protocols and Fish's Interpretative
assumptions discussed earlier In tbis chapter. Denida argues, '[ t)here
Is a labor -metaphysical or not- performed on conceptual systems'
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(Sec,J979:195). It Is In this labor towards dosure that we must
consider both the felicities and the Infelicities of the larger structure
because we need to be aware of the fact that subgenerlc Indicators. or
words, can do more than one thing in one context at any given time.
Thus we are well aware of the fact that the Reader Function can derive
a multiplicity of Interpretations from a magic realist narrative because
the appropriateness conditions that make up the subgenre
continuously play within a multiplicity of contexts, each, In turn,
performing to the base principle of another larger structure.
Closure, therefore, Is an act of labor that Is momentary and
contextual to the Reader Function's beliefs or reasons as to why a
particular explanation of a subgenerlc act Is the way It Is, or why a
particular Author Function has written the way he or she has chosen
to write. Once again, the narrative strategy of Ryan-Fazllleau,
outlined In this chapter, Is a particularly fruitful example of this set
of circumstances. We can never close the system, we can only close our
acts. Thus while a Reader Function may produce an act of closure on
the work of a particular Author Function, such an act of closure,
especially when It Is a written verbal performance, Institutes that
Reader Function as an author In the position of Author Function. The
dualism of such an Institutional status Is equally subject to the
participatory action of the self-same Reader Function or another
Reader Function ad Lnjlnltum. In Hegelian terms of !he master and
slave analogy, '!the master] has become aware of his dependence on
his slave; that he himself is reduced to slave because he cannot be
master without the second self-consciousness' (Rice, 1974:366). Such
Is the nature of Authority In the larger structure.
Let us examine this proposition further within the context of
the microtown and macrotown analogy. Indeed. we can state that,
while the two can be cited In a binary opposition, they do In fact eXIst
in the forces that constitute the poststructural hierarchy. Such a
master I slave interdependency is all pexvasive when we consider that
the townsfolk believe themselves to be Imprisoned by the Authority of
Gleason's model town. But we should also consider the fact that this
Interdependency ls conditional. Gleason's position as the master Is
based on the d!aloglsm that unites the macrotown with the mlcrotown
In the minds of the townsfolk. The unity Is generated by the narrative
that seems to explain the Intentional origin of the current
predicament. However, what the townsfolk fall to notice, and what the
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Reader Function of 'American Dreams' can understand by the magic
realist subgenre, Is that the larger structure does not wholly determine
the contextfrom whtch the narrative ts supposed to ortgtnate.
In the short story, the mlcrotown Is the narrative; It Is the
larger structure which can be read and analysed with closure of Its
meaning In mind. By the base principle of magic realism, the
mlcrotown Is built on meticulous detail, and It harnesses the
approprtateness conditions of the macrotown in its own terms in order
to exert lllocutionary forces onto the multiplicity of contexts that
exist in the macrotown. But mtcrotown does not wholly determine that
which can possibly occur ln macrotown because its narrative can only
close specific contexts. if, and only if, mtcrotown ts conceived as the ortgtn
of Authority will it sustain a degree of specific closure In the Searlean
scheme of thtngs. Otherwise, it ts subject to a deferral of closure tn the
dlffering contextual multiplicities untU such time both Author Functton and
Reader Function implement a tentative closure on the basts of the
dynamics of their dialogue.
For example, while the narrator's father Is narrated in the
microtown as having a fascination with bicycles and gears for time
immemorial, the father in the macrotown not only runs ·a petrol
station [but[ he was also an inventor' (1974:102). In the macrotown,
the multiplicity of contexts exists simply because of the selfperformatlvlty of the appropiateness conditions, namely its people and
culture. We must remember that, unlike the narrator. his father is
much more sympathetic to what he thinks Gleason's reasons might
have been. Perhaps it was, after all, to let the townsfolk see the beauty
of their own town rather than escaping into the towns. or cities, of
American dreams. But because we are caught up in the word of the
narrator, this small point made by the father, and perhaps a refracted
word of Carey as Author Function, is relegated to the margins by the
Authority and Intentionality that Is constructed through the narrator
In his performing the cyclic and singular predicament of the larger
structure In which he dentes his equal partnership of Authority.
This analogy of the mlcrotown as the larger structure, the
subgenre, and the macrotown as the quantum level of language. Is
equally applicable to the other short stories that we have discussed In
the previous two chapters. Consider the dolls in 'Peeling' and how they
conform to the combined force of synecdochic enchantment and the
inferentheme In attempting to produce, for the narrator, the larger
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structure, or the narrative, on Nile. At all times, Nile remains at the
quantum level of language, and Is thereby able to be thrown Into the
multiplicity of contexts by an act of peeling that brings the larger
structure back to its graphem.atic nature of appropriateness
conditions. Even In 'Report on the Shadow Industry', the analogy
finds a place. It Is the production of shadows that Indicate the
presence of some larger structure, and their consumption that
determines the extent to which the larger structure relies on its
approprtat.eness conditions that shift In a multiplicity of contexts.
I mentioned earlier In the chapter that we need to undertake a
search for the common denominators of a strong closure, and this
would allows us to agree upon that which constitutes the closure
denominators. Thomas, discussing the Principle of Charity, states
that '[w)hen analyzing reasoning, always analyze it in the way that
Interprets It as the strongest possible reasoning compatible with the
inference indicators In the discourse' (1986:18). Although this
Principle is derived from propositional logic, it does the Reader
Function no harm to appropriate Its directives to the analysts of
subgeneric indicator~ in the larger structure of the narrative. Let us
now consider. therefore. how closure denominators, as leads
constructed by Carey, allow for two common readings of 'American
Dreams'. We are here, of course, returning to the extra-literary
conditions of postn'loden11sm and postcolonialism, outlined in chapter
one, as a possibillty for magic realism.
In an interview with Willbanks, Carey has stated that' !w]c are a
culture of fixing somethtng up, making do with what's available,
rather than creating something new. Ours is a failure of confidence'
(1991 :53). And in an earlier interview with Van !kin, he stated that
'most of nw characters live in a spiritually impoverished world which
they don't feel part of (1977:33). In conjunction with the magic realist
subgenre and its appropriateness conditions, both these statements
allow for the Reader Function to perform an analysis that is strongly
suggestive of the postmodem extra-llterary condition. Lamb, therefore,
Is able to argue that "'American Dreams" Is a haunting parody of
Australia's eagerness to adopt the superficiality of American
materialism as a banner of success' (1992: 18). This state of parody, or
pastiche, so central to postmodemlsm is what allows the townsfolk of
'American Dreams' not only to adopt American materialism as the
banner of success, but also to adopt the 'romantic' spiritualism that
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accompanies such dreams of success In their splrltually Impoverished
world.
Selden argues that '[t)he postmodern experience Is widely held
to stem from a profound sense of ontological uncertainty' (1985:72). In
'American Dreams', the nature of being Is constantly questioned by
the lntertextual uncertainty of the mlcrotown's status of narrative
and macrotown's multiplicity of contexts by Its appropriateness
conditions. In the concluding paragraphs of the story, the question of
which town Is real and which town Is a 'clever forgery' (1974:113) Is
debated when the American tourists cannot see a similarity between
the micro-narrator and the macro-narrator. Is microtown a parody of
the dreams and people In macrotown, or Is It the reverse? What had
once been the dream that brought the community together In a
transcendental state of perfection now divides that community by the
fragmented playfulness of the dream's 'rear existence In both
microtown and macrotown. That is to say, the dream of American
materialism and spiritualism has become the recurring reality of what
it means to exist for the extreme wants and needs of popular
culturlsm, to exist as a product In both the physical and metaphysical
worlds of commodity consumplton. That Is the logical extension of the
inferentheme's illocutionary force and the ground rule reversal of the
fantastic indicator in a postn10dern context.
Indeed, the town exists as both closure denominator and
cmnmodity between Author Function and Reader Function, between
Gleason and the narrator, and between Carey and ourselves. It is
through the town's eventual classification as a tourist attraction that
the postmodern condition exerts lts strongest force in the text. In
conjunction with the base principle, the town In all lls meticulous
detail, becomes the object of analysis, Interpretation, and media
classification to the extent that the larger structure Is sh.:>wtng signs
of being peeled away Into Its appropriateness conditions. As the
narrator states, 'the next day we were all over the newspapers. The
photographs of the model people side by side with the photographs of
the real people. And our names and ages and what we dld were all
printed there In black and white' (1974:111).
Falgley argues that, In postmodern theory, 'the subject Is an
effect rather than a cause of discourse' (1992:9). This Is, of course,
most typified by the American dreaming that occurs In the short story.
For the narrator and the townsfolk to dream of 'blg smooth cars
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cruising through cities with bright lights', 'expensive night clubs',
malting 'love to women like Kim Novak and men like Rock Hudson' Is
to dream the dream that Is produced by Hollywood's motion picture
packages. Subjectivity, In this postmodern sense, Is the effect of a
speech act that evolves with the Increasing desire to produce new
stimuli for gratification. However, the dream's potency at the level of
tourist attraction Is so predominant that at the level of the ground
rule reversal, the tnferentheme Institutes the logic of another body of
knowledge that causes dispute between the American tourists, who
seek gratification, and the townsfolk, who are unable to gratifY, as
tourist attraction. As we have already discussed, what Is analysed and
Interpreted tn the macrotown Is believed to be, as tlmespace is subject
to change, an Infelicity of the micro town.
Ross states that '[t]he wall that encloses Mr. Gleason's secret
also has Its parallels In the labyrinths that figure so often In Borges'
fiction' (1990:53), and that '[f]or Carey, the metaphor of the labyrinth
emerges not only as a metaphysical structure that turns inward and
devours Itself but also as a physical entity' I 1990:54). Indeed, this
notion of the labyrinth can be argued as the appropriate metaphor for
the postmodern preoccupation with the parody or pastiche. Like the
magic realist subgenre itself. the microtown acts as a metaphor for the
increasing space that the larger structure occupies once the Amertcan
tourist, as a Reader Function, enters its domain of appropriateness
conditions. The townsfolk, however, cannot see this ever increasing
space because they themselves arc an effect of the timespace play of
appropriateness conditions. When Initially faced with their own
labyrinth, all they can see Is 'the big wall [surrounding the top ofj
Bald Hill' II974:104) and the 'small blind wall that had been obVIously
constructed this special purpose' I 1974: I 05). Once the walls come
down, once the larger structure Is peeled away, their ability to see past
the blind wall Into their own status as appropriateness conditions
becomes so foregrounded that they collapse Into the labyrinth of their
own fragmented and displaced identities.
I have already mentioned In chapter one that postcolonlalism,
as extra-literary condition, reinvents that which Is the focus of the
narrative. Within the context of our argument, the opportunity ts
made available, through the appropriateness conditions, for the shift
from one larger structure to another affiliated larger structure to
occur. This Is possible due to the multiplicity of contexts we have
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already discussed, and because a single context must inadvertently
have within Itself the performatlvlty of another, affiliated, context.
Thus postmodernlsm, has at all Urnes, the possibility of
postcolonialism within the context of Its extra-literary condition.
What we might consider to be an Infinite play of parody or pastiche
can indeed form the basis of a cultural reinvention. Indeed,
postcolonialism Itself Is marked by a contextual shift In the larger
structure on the quantum level of language.
Fletcher ( 1991 I argues that Carey uses hts c'laracters In a
satiric manner as vehicles of exposure for the concepts of
Imprisonment and colonial hegemony which are prevelant In much
Australian literature. Thus we could argue that an exposure tn such a
manner helps to give rise to an acceptance of historical multiplicities
and may further help the move toward cultural reinvention In the face
of the Infelicities which continually play In our Anglo-Celtic national
identity. In "American Dreams', this type of reinvention by the
Incorporation of Infelicities Is avoided In order to keep the !den tlty of
the American dreamers, and the hegemony of the ministry of Tourism,
Intact In the face of the adulterous relationship discovered In
microtown and macrotown. As the narrator states,
We looked at the mlnlsler mlstmstfully, wondertug If he knew about
Mrs. Cavanagh. and he must have seen the look bxause he said that
certain controversial Items would be removed. had already been
rernooed. We shifted In our seats. like you do when a particularly
tense part of a film has come tn Its climax. and then we relaxed and
llstened to what the mlnlster had to say. And we all began, once
more, to dream our American dreams (1974: Ill. My ltallcs).
The fact that Gleason knew of Mrs. Cavanagh and young Craigie
Evans further triggers the possibility, In the minds of the townsfolk,
that he knew of many more Infelicities that played within the
appropriateness conditions of macrotown. Indeed, the minister for
Tourism's arrival In the town signals the relief townsfolk feel In the
presence of an Authority, of an Author Function, that exceeds the
Intentional forces of Gleason through mlcrotown. In the face of the
idealistic prosperity that accompanies the word of the minister for
Tourism, the narrator states, 'once more, we changed our opinion of
Gleason' (1974: ill). What the townsfolk do not realise Is that, In the
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future, their fragmented and displaced Identities are the logical
progression of their own desire and gratification for a felicitous
narrative that accommodates the wants and needs of a body of
knowledge as well as the popular culturalism of their choice. At the
level of the ground rule reversal, the lnferentheme takes the townsfolk's
choice readily to the level of a popular Institution, tourism.
McSherry, commenting on the repercussions of this status quo
In the extra-literacy environment of the text, states that 'Australians
have apathetically accepted the control by foreigners whether through
industry or cultural ideals. Not only are the workers trapped In
meaningless jobs but their labour Is owned by foreigners and If they
dream of escape they dream American not Australian dreams' ( 1983/
84:86). While the Implied conclusions In McSherry's argument come
across as idealistic essentialism in the face of an everpresent dynandc
of appropriateness conditions, or Australian multiculturalism, her
allusion to cultural and Industrial hegemony Is an Important
prel..!ursor to the performances that make up a percentage of the
tllocuu.-. n.s in both 'American Dreams' and the extra-!iterary reality of
the Reau.:• Function. When Sage argues that 'Carey's people are
ontologtcally ·J,,::i '"~ed' ( 1995: 18), her proposition has equal force for
the Reader FuncUc.a within the context of'Amertcan Dreams'.
That Is to say, a challenge of origin, or beingness, is drawn
between the Carey character In the literacy reality, and the character
of the Reader Function In the extra-literary reality. It is a
metaphysical comparison designed to foreground the gaze qJ ontological
uncertainty made by hegemonic tourists, demanding to be reassured by
the townsfolk, as objects of the gaze, that no difference exists between
their pseudo-Australian dreams of macrotown, generated by micro town
as the origin, brochure, or guage, and the corresponding macrotown of
the townsfolk's American dreams. 'On Bald Hill there arc half a dozen
telescopes through which the Americans can spy on the town and
reassure themselves that it is the same down there as it is on Bald
Hill' (19'74:112). B,;t the difference Is, of course, that Amerlemo
tourists can step out of their Australian dreams while the Australian
townsfolk are Increasingly caught. as time progresses, In the lunacy of
having to perform In the ftxed Ideals of an American dream that
constructs them as products of the ontological gaze. As time
progresses, It is the American tourist who controls the American
dreams and ontology of the Australian townsfolk, and not the
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Australians themselves.
In an Interview with Wyndham, Carey states that '[m]ost of my
work has been to do with what It means to be Australian, which Is a
bit 19th century but also, for me and for Australians, Vitally
Important because [we are] still concerned about finding ourselves'
(1994:48). Once agatn, It Is Important that we understand that not all
magic realist speech acts concern themselves with the postcolonial,
but In the case of 'American Dreams', what we find Is the forerunner
to much of the postcolonial Issues that thematically occupy the
narratives of Carey's later novels. Hassan states that '[l]n his two
earlier volumes of short stories, Carey charts the lives of a collection
of physical and I or psychological pygmies who seek to master "the
system" but end up Instead as Its Inmates and victims or on display as
Its clowns' [1989:652).
Thus a combination of these two readings, of the postmodern
and the postcolonial extra-literary conditions, forms the basis of an
Intention,• illy that belongs to Carey as Author Function, and to which
we contribute as Reader Functions in the dynamics of the dialogue we
have called Authority. Even the magtc realist subgenre gtves preference
to this kind of dialogic Interaction by the appropriateness condition's
ab!lttes to produce tnfel!ctties tn the larger structure. Closure In the
narrative, therefore, ts determined by both tnfellctttes and felicities to
the types of speech acts that theoretical disciplines Illuminate in their
methodological analysts. And, as we have stated earlier In this
chapter,just as appropriateness condltfons can Incorporate more than one
context tn the lllocutlon of a subgenertc indicator, so lao can
appropriateness conditions incorporate both the Author Function and the
Reader Function in the contextual closure of an lllocutton. Thus closure Is
not <' c imposstb!ltty within a system that can tin ucs to play as long as
its exphnatory scope is grounded In the Principle of Charity for both
the felicity and the Infelicity. In either case, one context leads to the
multiplicity of contexts. If we recall the father's statement mentioned
earlier in this chapter, we can perhaps conclude that Gleason's
intentionality over macrotown through microtown is determined by
the direction and message of mlcrotown's Indicators pointing to the
initial beauty of macrotown, rather than exerting a force of eventual
imprisonment over the townsfolk In their American dreams.
Indeed, It could well be argued that Gleason's mlcrotown
allowed for a postcolonial reinvention of macrotown, but the
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townsfolk, treating the town badly In their minds, let their town and
themselves slip Into the logical status of mlcrotown as a postmodern
tomist attraction, or what Baudrlllard (1983) would call the hyperreal.
Thus 'American Dreams', as a narrative in the larger structure of
magic realism, foregrounds the multiplicity and self-participation In
the construction of an Identity through appropriateness conditions In
both the literary and extra-literary realities. Every appropriateness
condition associated with a context has the ability to shift and be
shifted, thereby altering the illocuttonary force of the larger structure
under examination. And, with such a shift, there wlll also be a
reinvention of the Infelicities, alongside the alre~.dy known felicities,
that Institute the !llocutlonary acts and forces of the subgenerlc
speech act. Thus, by the larger structure of magic realism, the Reader
Function, through an understanding of 'American Dreams', Is left
with an awareness of the multiplicity of appropriateness condition. of
contexts and forces, that make up the Australian Identity, the
Australian speech acts. and ultimately, the Australian speech genres.
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Conclusion.
While this thesis bears the title Speaking Magic Realism, It could
equally be considered a pseudonym for the broader philosophical
approach which we may categorize as a speech act theory of parasitic
discourse. The point, which must always be considered, Is that the
analysis of !llocuttons does not need to be solely governed by either an
Austln!an or Searlean !nvesttgatton, especially when It comes to the
cross fertilization of lllocutlonary acts In both ordinary and parasitic
circumstances. This Is not to suggest that current and P"tentlal speech
act theorists abandon Austlntan or Searlean methodologies, but to
remind them that the stance they take to parasitic dtscurslvlty
reduces the analysis of, and conclusions on, the nature of ordinary
discourse, or language as a philosophical field.
When Austin gives an example of a performatlve misfire In Don
Quixote, he Is not only contradicting his own conclusions on !he
distinctions between ordinary and parasitic, but he also demonstrates
that his contradiction holds a viable truth for the Inclusion of the
parasite Into the Aust!nlan scheme of things. For us, this translates
Into the equal consideration of both ordinary and parasitic whenever
we discuss the speech act. Although we have mainly concentrated on
parasitic discourse In this thesis. further research could look at how
the !llocuttons of speech acts are both the product of ordinary and
parasitic circumstances, and how a combination of the two help to
illuminate the act in question as well as the forces it releases during
the course of a perfonnance.
In this sense, then, the thesis has given, as already stated, a
single, subgener!c example of a type of speech act In a myriad of acts.
The choice to analyse magic realism was primarily based on its overt
foreground!ng of the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions, and
thus helped to establish a methodology which Is possibly much easter
than existing ones. However, It Is my contention that the methodology
In this thesis Is applicable to all subgener!c acts, although I do
entertain the possibility that within each and every subgener!c act,
the larger structure w!ll change the methodology In a manner that Is
relevant to its conditions under examination. One n1ust remember
that this thesis Is about the nature of the conditions In a subgenertc
performance, and how those conditions translate Into Indicators with
!llocutlonary forces. Each and every narrative participates In a
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performance of some type or another. Thus all narratives are
positioned in the propositional content of a subgenre where the base
principle organizes the multiplicity of appropriateness conditions Into
a larger structure recognizable to the Reader Function. Further
research Is needed to take this methodology and seek to apply it
elsewhere, Uluminatlng the performances. or propositional conte"ts of
subgenres other than magic realism.
In the case of genre theory, the propositional content of the
subgenre complements one half of the contactjunctlon in our model of
the Functions of Language. Indeed, this thesis has mainly concerned
Itself with the types of lllocutlonary Influences that the propositional
content of a subgenre, namely magic realism, exerts during the course
of a narrative performance. Further research needs to examine the
Influences of the other half of the contactjunction, namely the medium
that enframes a particular narrative performance. That Is to say, what
type of tllocutlonary forces, If any, do the media exert on the types of
performances under investigation? With respect to magic realism, we
have made minor mention of one media influence, and that is the
predominance of the short story's sjuzhet In the subgenerlc magic
realism of Carey's narratives.
We have not, however, had the opportunity to examine in full
the effects and Influences of the types of lllocutions that such a
component of the medium in the contact.functlon exerts during the
course of a narrative performance. Thus, an area of research that
needs to be undertaken is that which pertains directly to the media
employed during narrative performances in the contact.functlon. One
only needs to consider what types of influences make the short story
different from other larger structures, such as the novel, poetry, or
drama, tn order to begin postulating differences between poettc
illocutions. dramatic illocutions, and novelistic illocutions.
Furthermore, this notion of examining the media in the contact
junction simultaneously wllh the propositional content does not stop
short of parasitic discourse. Indeed, ordinary language could benefit
from such an analysis In order to establish the Influences of speech
genres In dally speech. Two parasitic examples of the Influence of
speech genres can be found in the classic characterizations of Emma
Bovary and Don Quixote. where the performances of each character
mirror the types of posstblllties In the literary reality, during the
cross-fertilization of ordinary and parasitic dlscurstvlttes tn the
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performance of a single speaker. In the extra-literacy reality, such a
concurrence can occur between the socio-conventional understanding
of lllocutlons and the particular lllocutlonary acts of a substratum of
speakers. In layman's terms, the appropriation of a denotative word
within the connotative circumstances and conditions of a vocational
group could be traced back to the particular generic and subgenertc
constnlCUons of the contactjunction.
All In all, while one can always practise either an Austlnlan or
Searlean method of speech act theory In ordinary circumstances, the
pervasive nature of parasitic discourse, as evidence to the contracy,
suggests that an Austlnlan or Searlean approach Is not the apotheosis
of the theory Itself. indeed, our model of the Functions of Language
makes space for the Austlnlan and Searlean approaches In the
functlonnl level of the code, but, as the genre/ subgenre alliance of
the contactjunction Implies, the 1llocutlons of parasitic discourse are
equally applicable to ordinary circumstances. If language Is the
organizing force of that entity we call consciousness, then it acts as a
base principle for the architectonics between speakers and their
stratified worlds. What characterizes language must characterize
consciousness, and If language in ordinary circumstances creates and
marks the conventions of our thought, then parasitic discourse
cannot but do the same thing because of itS colourful existence within
and reliance upon the codes that mark 'ordinary' language. Without
ordinary language, we cannot have the organized basics of linguistic
thought, and without its parasitic equal. we cannot have the colourful
multiplicity that marks variance in concepts, nor the stylistic variance
of stratified speakers as living Author and Reader Functions.
The stratified speaker, whether ltterary or not. occupies a
unique space and time within the word by the suhgenre In which that
speaker forges his or her name and signature. Who, then, is the
narrator of 'American Dreams'? He is the ideologue of a bourgeoisie
and a secular hedonism that has stylized the Australian social strata
since Federation. He prefers the narrative of global culture, rather
than the cringe of parochialism, under the hegemony of fashionable
Americanism. He Is the product of both parasitical and ordlnarsr
discursive circumstances. He is, like any other speaker, whether
literary or not, a product of the speech genres that Interest him and
mark him. He is, in terms of consciousness, an lllocution.
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